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 The concept of habit has had a controversial history in psychology, but support for a habit theory 
is plentiful in various areas of research, such as learning and environmental psychology, including 
embodied and dual-process theories of cognition. Further, recent advances in measurement have provided 
support for habit as an independent construct and enabled research into the contribution of habits to a 
wide variety of behaviors. As a framework to guide further advances, I propose a 3-part conceptualization 
based on recurring elements within the definitions of habit in previous research: Habits are patterns of 
responding characterized by repetition, automaticity, and psychological association. While previous 
research has focused heavily on repetition and automaticity, association has mostly been assumed rather 
than explored directly. I conducted 3 studies with the goal of demonstrating the presence of association in 
habit, testing association-based assumptions in previous habit research, and developing a tool for 
measuring the associative strength of a habit. This work may have useful implications for health behavior 
change—habits are likely to be key determinants of many health behaviors, and the hypothesized 
associative nature of habits may be a particularly effective target for novel intervention strategies. 
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A Three-Component Framework for Habits 
What Is a Habit? 
Deriving an integrated definition. Habit researchers have used a variety of definitions 
of “habit” in recent years, and the patterns that emerge from shared elements offer insight into 
the theoretical nature of habits in two important ways (see Appendix A for an overview). First, 
the most overt goal of such definitions is delineating the characteristics of a habit—that is, 
describing what a habit would look like. Here, we base a conceptualization on a selection of 
themes that reappear with relative consistency across the literature. The first of these themes is 
repetition, which is thought to support the formation of a habit. The second is association, 
especially between a contextual cue and a response, and is thought to be learned from repetition. 
The third is automaticity, which is thought to result from the learning and subsequent activation 
of the cue/response association. Automaticity, in turn, is thought to increase further repetition. 
Together, these features—repetition, association, and automaticity—form the three central 
defining characteristics of a habit, and differentiate habits from other related constructs (see 
Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. A 3-component definitional model of habits differentiates habits from similar and 
related constructs, such as routine and reflex. 
 
 The second goal of defining a habit is pinpointing exactly what it is that, when it 
possesses the above characteristics, may be labeled as a habit. That is, specifying exactly what 
the word “habit” refers to. Past definitions display variation on this issue as well, and appear to 
refer to a variety of concepts, including behavior, behavioral tendencies or dispositions, mental 
representations, and even automaticity itself. In the current view, the term “habit” is most 
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usefully applied to a pattern of responding.1 We argue that “response” is a more appropriate term 
than “behavior,” because (a) some habits are not behavioral, but rather cognitive or emotional 
(see below); and (b) it implies the presence of the eliciting cue. In addition, we argue that 
“pattern” is more appropriate than “response” alone, because (a) an isolated behavior, thought, or 
feeling does not constitute a habit; and (b) the term “pattern” implies the necessary feature of 
repetition over time.  
 Based on the synthesis of previous theoretical and empirical treatments of habits, we 
therefore suggest the following integrated definition: Habits are patterns of responding that are 
(a) repeated over time, (b) mediated by a learned psychological association, and (c) 
automatically activated. 
 Specifying component definitions. To best clarify the above conceptualization of habits, 
consider the following definitions of the terms that it constitutes. A response is any change in 
the cognitive or sensorimotor systems produced as a reaction to the perception of a cue. A 
response could take many different forms. Although empirical studies have focused on 
behavioral responding, a handful of studies have investigated cognitive responding (Verplanken, 
Friborg, Wang, Trafimow, & Woolf, 2007), and previous theorizing does make mention of 
“habits of thinking” (e.g., Lewin, 1943). Presumably affective responding falls within the 
domain of “habit” as well, though we are not yet aware of any relevant research. 
 A cue may be anything that can be perceived, including features of the physical or social 
environment, or even a person’s own affects, cognitions, and behaviors. A given stimulus is 
defined as a cue by virtue of its ability to elicit a response. Repetition is expression of the 
response on multiple occasions. In colloquial use, the term “habit” is often used merely to 																																																								
1 Importantly, under this nomenclature, the term “habit” does not refer to a psychological construct or process, but 
rather an emergent phenomenon or set of outcomes that arise from the action and interaction of psychological 
constructs and processes (e.g., mental association, perception of a cue, behavioral schemata). 
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describe the things that a person does over and over. This view is reflected in a long history of 
research, wherein the construct of habit strength was operationalized as the frequency of a 
behavior’s repetition (Ajzen, 2002). Including repetition as a definitional characteristic is, 
therefore, a matter of crucial face validity as well as discriminant validity. Association is a 
psychological connection between the cue and the response. This association is learned across 
repeated pairings of the cue and response. Automaticity is the production of the response as a 
reaction to the perception of the cue, without the need for conscious intent or awareness. 
 It may be important to note that this framework is distinct from, but compatible with, 
previous conceptualizations of habits that are structured around two “stages” of habits, 
acquisition and expression (see Table 1). These perspectives do not compete with each other, but 
rather serve different purposes. A stage-based model describes the life cycle of a habit, and a 
feature-based model forms a statement about what makes habits unique as a psychological 
phenomenon. Theoretically, the three defining characteristics that I propose play unique and 
crucial roles during both the acquisition and expression of habits. Further, the three proposed 
characteristics do not consolidate logically into two. Although they are related to each other and 
likely influence each other, I propose that they are separate from each other. Notably, in spite of 
the pervasiveness of the three components in contemporary definitions of habit, my efforts to 
date have not located any empirical evidence to substantiate that they are necessary and 
sufficient for the purpose of distinguishing habit from other related phenomena. This 
contradiction highlights the need for further work toward expanding knowledge of the 
associative nature of habits, as described in the research proposed below. 
 Nonetheless, this conclusion does derive some theoretical support from the apparent fact 
that it is possible for a phenomenon to possess any one or two of the characteristics without 
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possessing all three (see Figure 1). Reflexes such as withdrawing from pain are automatic 
(requiring no decision or intention), yet they are only infrequently engaged and do not appear to 
be mediated by psychological association (but rather nerve pathways in the spinal column). As 
Ajzen (2002) pointed out, certain actions may be performed so frequently as to be considered 
routine (e.g., a doctor deciding to send a patient into surgery), but they do not become automatic 
and are not triggered by psychological associations, and also are not considered to be habits. 
Experimentally induced “ideomotor” effects occur both automatically and as the result of 
psychological association, but they are not repeated in the course of normal life, and would not 
generally be considered to be habits. 
 Similarly, humans perform homeostatic regulation (e.g., maintenance of a stable body 
temperature) both automatically and repeatedly (e.g., circadian rhythms), yet there is no evidence 
that psychological association plays a necessary role in such processes, and being warm-blooded 
would not regularly be considered a matter of habit. Some interventions prompt participants to 
form implementation intentions by verbally pairing a healthy behavior (e.g., eating an apple) 
with an eliciting cue (returning home in the afternoon). Implementation intentions are thought to 
work by building psychological associations. Few would consider an implementation intention to 
constitute a habit if performed once during the intervention but never again afterward. Crucially, 
however, the end goal of interventions such as these is that the participant will articulate the 
implementation intention repeatedly (daily, or at each appropriate time interval), thereby causing 
the cue-response link to become automatic, and forming a full habit (Figure 1).  
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How Do Habits Relate to Other Constructs? 
 The history of habit research is rich with inquiries into the connections between habits 
and other factors that determine behavior. This abundance may be due to the striking ability of 
habits to defy intention. One very relatable example is meaning to take a new route on the drive 
to work, but inadvertently taking the old route without realizing (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). 
Research has proposed and explored multiple relationships between habits and other constructs. 
 First, habits can act as independent influences to behavior. One tradition in habit research 
is comparing the influence of habit on behavior to that of other behavioral precursors, such as the 
Theory of Planned Behavior’s (TPB) constructs—intentions, attitudes, perceived social norm, 
and perceived behavioral control (Ajzen, 1991). Many researchers have attempted to improve on 
the TPB by adding constructs and links to account for influences such as habit (Haddock & 
Maio, 2004). An early attempt (Bentler & Speckart, 1979) used structural equation modeling to 
apply this inquiry to substance use on campus, and found that the inclusion of past behavior 
significantly improved the model’s ability to predict future behavior. This same general finding 
has been replicated with a range of other behaviors, including condom use, class attendance, 
seatbelt use, and blood donation (Albarracín, Fishbein, Johnson, & Muellerleile, 2001; Jaccard & 
Blanton, 2005). The Model of Goal Directed Behavior (Perugini & Bagozzi, 2001) takes a 
similar approach by supplementing the TPB variables with automatic processes (i.e., habit), 
motivational processes, and affective processes. Such research is useful for demonstrating that 
central habit processes can have a direct effect on behavior that rivals that of other, well-
supported sources of behavioral influence. 
 Secondly, habits moderate the effects of other behavioral precursors. In addition to 
exerting direct effects on behavior, research has demonstrated that habit-relevant constructs can 
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interact with other inputs to behavior. For instance, Eagly and Chaiken (1993) noted that in order 
for attitudes to affect behavior, they “must be coordinated with other psychological tendencies 
that regulate behavior. That is, the presence of a habit moderates the effect of persuasion on 
behavior. Consistent with this argument, a meta-analysis of intervention studies (Webb & 
Sheeran, 2006) found that changing intentions was significantly less effective at creating 
behavior change when the behavior in question was likely to be habitual—that is, performed 
frequently and in a stable context. As will be familiar to anyone who has ever tried dieting or 
giving up smoking, bad habits can be extremely hard to break. 
 Third, habits may affect other behavioral precursors directly, in addition to interacting 
with them. Due to processes such as self-observation and cognitive dissonance, repeatedly 
performing a behavior can affect the way that one perceives that behavior (Ouellette & Wood, 
1998). This relationship is represented in theoretical models such as the Model of Goal Directed 
Behavior (Perugini & Bagozzi, 2001), in which past behavior—as a proxy for habit—exerts a 
direct effect on intention to complete a behavior. Bentler and Speckart’s (1979) model specified 
the very same pathway, and received mixed support in empirical demonstration (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993). Similarly, a composite model of attitude-behavior relations (Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993) specifies that past behavior has a direct effect on attitude, and an indirect effect on 
perceived self-identity outcomes, which relates to the extent thatevaluation of one’s self will be 
affected by performing the behavior. 
 Fourth, other behavioral precursors can be involved in habits. In an experiment, habitual 
bicycle riders responded to the word “bicycle” faster after being primed with the goal of 
transportation to locations nearby (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000). In that case, the sudden 
psychological salience of a goal served as a cue, eliciting the habitual response relevant to 
	8		
reaching the goal. Various psychological precursors to behavior can also come into play as 
habitual responses themselves. For instance, Ajzen and Fishbein explained that, due to learned 
associations between an attitude and its object, the mere presence of the object can cue activation 
of the attitude and its attendant attitudinal beliefs (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2011). 
 Interestingly, Ajzen and Fishbein (2011) made this point in order to argue against the 
existence of habit. They point out that direct control of a stimulus over a behavior is not 
necessary to account for the ability of the former to elicit the latter—automatically accessed 
attitudes can explain this link as well. Nonetheless, the current model’s inclusion of cognition 
(such as attitudes) in habitual responding would suggest that some form of habit is at work 
regardless of whether the habitual response takes the form of a behavior or an attitude. This 
conceptualization is relevant to theories in psychological research on stereotypes and prejudice, 
which involve the repeated, automatic activation of negative attitudes toward a social group due 
to a learned and practiced association between that group and some undesirable trait (Devine, 
1989). In essence, we suggest that prejudice could be interpreted as a habit of negative thoughts 
and feelings toward another group and its members. 
 In sum, we propose a three-component framework: Habits are patterns of responding that 
are repeated, mediated by cue-response associations, and automatically activated. Though 
previous research has focused mainly on environmental stimuli as cues for behavioral responses, 
we posit that both cues and response can include any manner of perceptions, cognitions, affects, 
or behaviors. This conceptualization is useful because it helps integrate a complex and diverse 
body of research. Namely, it ties together research suggesting that habits (a) compete with other 
behavioral precursors, (b) moderate the effects of other precursors, (c) are shaped by other 
precursors, and (d) involve other precursors. 
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What is known about habits? 
 Repetition. Inquiry into the nature of habits dates at least as far back as Aristotle, who 
reportedly said, “We are what we repeatedly do.” The history of habits in psychology stretches 
back over 120 years (James, 1890). Throughout the majority of this history, psychologists have 
conceptualized and measured habits in terms of the repetition of behavior. In particular, many 
studies used the frequency of past behavior as an indicator of habit strength, and there is 
consequently a rich body of literature demonstrating that repeated past behavior is among the 
best predictors of future behavior. Ouellette and Wood’s (1998) meta-analysis revealed that, for 
behaviors performed daily or weekly in stable contexts, past behavior significantly predicted 
future behavior and even out-performed intention (βs = 0.45 and 0.27, respectively). The 
behaviors represented in their sample of studies included alcohol and coffee drinking, various 
exercises, seat belt usage, and classroom and church attendance. 
 Of course, conceptualizing habits as behavioral repetition alone presented a number of 
problems, not the least of which is its circular logic—if habits predict behavioral frequency and 
habits are behavioral frequency, then habits predict nothing more than themselves. In addition, 
not all frequent behaviors seem to form habits, and those that do seem to have an inconsistent 
relationship between frequency and future behavior (Verplanken, 2006). Moreover, a separate 
habits construct is not necessary to account for a relationship between past and future behavior. 
A variety of factors have been shown to influence behaviors (Ajzen, 1991), and to the extent that 
these remain stable it is reasonable to expect behavior to remain stable as well (Ajzen, 2002). 
To address this concern, a body of research emerged with the apparent goal of 
demonstrating that past behavior predicted future behavior above and beyond any other 
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behavioral input. A particularly popular target has been the most proximal predictor of behavior 
as specified by the Theory of Planned Behavior: intention. Though some studies were indeed 
able to identify instances in which behavioral frequency outperformed intention (Ouellette & 
Wood, 1998), the body of evidence as a whole is somewhat mixed (Ajzen, 2002). 
In addition, the meaning of a correlation between past behavior and future behavior is 
conceptually unclear, even when it is stronger than the correlation between intention and future 
behavior. Due to what is now known as the Principle of Compatibility (also called Principle of 
Correspondence), behavioral predictors are most effective when they match the behavior 
measured with regards to specificity in four areas (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), which they refer to 
collectively as TACT: (a) target—the entity toward which the behavior is directed, (b) action—
the behavior itself, (c) context—environment in which the behavior is performed, and (d) 
time—the occasion on which the behavior is performed. For instance, the frequency of washing 
one’s car is better predicted from attitudes toward washing one’s car than from attitudes toward 
cleaning in general. Likewise, the consistency of washing one’s car each Sunday is better 
predicted from attitudes toward washing one’s car on Sunday than from attitudes toward washing 
one’s car in general.  
This is an important consideration when interpreting correlations between past and future 
behavior because, within a given study, measures of these behaviors are typically the exact same 
measure (e.g., “how often did you complete behavior X in the past 2 weeks?”) administered at 
different time points. Past and future behaviors are therefore inherently and completely 
compatible with each other in terms of TACT specification. By comparison, measures of other 
predictors do not tend to be as compatible with the focal behavior in terms of TACT 
specification. Therefore it is difficult to conclude that the tendency of past behavior to predict 
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future behavior above and beyond other constructs is attributable to the operation of habit, and 
not merely the result of superior TACT compatibility and shared method variance (Ajzen, 2002). 
Perhaps even more concerning to proponents of habit research, betting the construct 
validity of habits on their ability to outperform intentions is unwise and could ultimately limit 
their use and development in research. Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger & Carlsmith, 
1959) and self-perception theory (Bem, 1967) would both predict that people’s self-reported 
intentions change to fit their behaviors. Indeed, at least one study found that habit strength 
predicted intentions better than did attitudes (Honkanen, Olsen, & Verplanken, 2005). A fixation 
on outperforming intention thus risks under-detecting the importance of habits because 
circumstances may render intentions a misleading point of comparison. 
 In addition, overruling intention is not a defining feature of the habit construct, but rather 
a convenient way of detecting their presence upon expression. Consider good habits, for 
instance. Habits can form as the result of the intention to perform a particular behavior regularly 
(Wood & Neal, 2007), and in such instances there is every reason to expect that intentions would 
continue to predict behaviors—people intend to carry out their good habits. In fact, in the case of 
the ultimate good habit—one that is performed with perfect adherence—both habit and intention 
would predict behavioral performance fully. Requiring habits to outperform intention thus may 
have the ironic effect of preventing the study of good habits! What is needed, then, is not to 
prove that behavioral frequency is a better predictor than any other psychological construct, but 
rather a way to measure habit strength independently from behavioral frequency (Ajzen, 2002; 
Verplanken, 2006). 
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Table 1: Tracking the roots of habits in extant theories.  
Association 
Theory Specification Application to habit theory 
Embodied 
Theories of 
Cognition (Barsalou 
& Niedenthal, 2005) 
Knowledge is formed as features from 
similar experiences are combined and 
associated 
Habits are learned from experiencing the cue and 
response together. 
The learning of an association is 
incremental 
Habits are learned over time, through repetition 
of the cue-response pairing 
The strength of the association changes 
as a function of the frequency of its use 
(and disuse). 
Frequent responses are most likely to become 
habits, and make for the strongest habits. Theory of Learning 
(Thorndike, 1901) 
Responses learned in one context can be 
transferred to a different context. This is 
facilitated by similarity between the two 
contexts. 
Habits are context dependent, but a habitual 
response can be elicited in a different context, 
especially if it is a similar one. 
Rewarding a response increases its 
frequency 
Rewarding a response helps form or strengthen 
the habit Operant 
Conditioning 
(Skinner, 1938) Punishing a response decreases its 
frequency 
Punishing a response can weaken or prevent the 
formation of habit 
Ecological Theory 
(Gibson, 2000) 
People are attuned to opportunities for 
action that the environment affords. 
Stimuli and features present in the environment 
can act as cues for habitual responses. 
Core 
Configurations 
Model 
(Caporael, 1997) 
Human cognitive systems are specially 
adapted to facilitate social coordination 
People and social interactions can act as cues for 
habitual responses 
Automaticity 
Theory Specification Application to habit theory 
Ideomotor Effect 
(Bargh & Chartrand, 
1999) 
In the case of strong mental associations, 
perceptions of a cue can lead directly to 
behavioral responses without conscious 
awareness or intent 
Habitual responding is automatic. Activation of 
the cue-response association leads directly to the 
production of the response. 
The processing and output of the 
reflective system relies upon 
mechanisms of the impulsive system. 
Habits can overpower conscious intentions. 
Impulsive and 
Reflective Systems 
Model (Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004) 
Impulsive processing is constantly 
engaged, whereas reflective processing 
fails when there is insufficient cognitive 
capacity available. 
Habits are more likely to be expressed under 
cognitive load, distraction, or exhaustion. 
Ironic Processes of 
Mental Control 
(Wegner, 1994) 
Suppressing a thought requires keeping 
it cognitively activated 
The cognitive availability of a habitual response 
cannot be decreased through direct intentional 
suppression 
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 Automaticity. Thankfully, another defining feature of habits, automaticity, has provided 
the basis for inroads toward measuring habit strength independently from behavioral frequency. 
Theoretically, habits derive their power over behavior from automaticity. To illustrate, consider 
the premises of the various theories that focus on a divide between conscious and unconscious or 
automatic cognitive processes, loosely united under the rubric of “dual-process” theories (Smith 
& DeCoster, 2000). A prominent recent example is Strack and Deutsch’s (2004) model of 
impulsive system and reflective systems2. Cognition in the impulsive system is automatic and 
preconscious, and is mediated by a network of associative links. Here, behavior is produced 
when the activation of a concept spreads through the network to a behavioral schema. Cognition 
in the reflective system is optional and usually conscious, and relies on a system of rules and 
evaluations of consistency and veridicality. Here, behavior is produced once a behavioral 
decision is reached, and the corresponding behavioral schemas are activated. 
 Consistent with other major models of cognitive automaticity (Anderson, 1996), the 
model specifies that the impulsive system is constantly engaged. The reflective system, by 
comparison, is often disengaged. Its operation requires high cognitive capacity and fails when 
available capacity is insufficient. It is therefore vulnerable to interference from distraction, 
exhaustion, and very high and low levels of arousal. This feature of the two-system model and 
other dual-process models accounts for the powerful effect of habits, as patterns of automatic 
behavior. One reason for this phenomenon is that the operation of conscious processes relies on 
automatic processes. Strack and Deutsch’s two-system model illustrates this idea: The reflective 
system retrieves concepts from the impulsive system and creates semantic meaning by imposing 
a relational schema (specifying how the concepts fit together) to create propositions, assigning a 																																																								
2 Strack and Deutsch prefer the term “two process,” which emphasizes the concurrent operation of both systems, in 
place of “dual process.” 
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truth value (specifying how true the resulting proposition is) to create semantic and episodic 
knowledge, and applying syllogistic rules (e.g. if A=B and B=C, A=C) to make inferences.
 In addition, the crucial last link in the reflective system’s output, the behavioral schema, 
resides within the impulsive system. Stated simply, the reflective system is capable of making its 
own conclusions, but it is not capable of reaching these conclusions or of acting on them without 
the help of the impulsive system. Therefore, when intention and automatic tendency are at odds, 
as in the case of a bad habit that one is trying to break, there are many advantages that the 
automatic processes of cognition can claim. Most vitally, in the above model, interfering with the 
function of the automatic systems also disrupts the conscious systems. This effect is apparent in 
the embodied cognition literature mentioned in the previous section. For instance, blocking the 
automatic facial movements that are involved in cognitive processing of emotion words reduces 
the accuracy of judgments regarding the meaning of the word (Niedenthal, Winkielman, 
Mondillon, & Vermuelen, 2009). Consequently, efforts by the conscious system to directly 
change the course of the automatic system are often futile at best, and counterproductive at 
worst.  
 Wegner’s research on the so-called white bear effect further illustrates this phenomenon. 
In a series of studies, participants who were instructed not to think about a white bear 
predominantly reported becoming increasingly preoccupied with the unwanted mental image, 
and success in banishing it by distraction was short-lived (Wegner, 1989, 1992). Wegner (1994) 
invoked a dual-process model to explain this effect, and hypothesized that the conscious (or 
“operating”) system that is responsible for intending to avoid the thought cannot do so without 
the help of the automatic (or “monitoring”) system that checks new thoughts for the presence of 
the unwanted one. To perform this task, however, the automatic system must keep the unwanted 
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thought active so that it may act as a standard of comparison, thus ironically increasing its 
availability to the conscious system. Similar ironic effects have been found in research on 
conscious attempts to control other states that are largely regulated by automatic processes, such 
as concentration, mood, relaxation, pain, belief, prejudice, and even movement (Wegner, 1994). 
Accounts such as these highlight the profound influence over behavior that a habit gains from its 
automaticity. A habit, once formed, can either be a mighty ally, ready to step in during times of 
need, or a nefarious saboteur, unblinking and spiteful. 
Given that automaticity seems to be the source of a habit’s power, it is sensible to 
measure habit strength in terms of automaticity. To this end, Verplanken and Orbell (2003) 
developed the Self Report Habit Index (SRHI) is a generalized 12-item scale that asks 
participants to rate the frequency and automaticity of a behavior in terms of its ability to be 
performed without awareness, in parallel to other behaviors, and despite conscious self-control 
efforts (Appendix A). A sizeable body of evidence suggests that this measure performs quite 
well. Since its creation, the SRHI has been applied to a variety of behaviors, including a variety 
of health behavior domains, and accounts for the most convincing evidence to date of the 
influence of habits in health behaviors. 
Researchers have gravitated toward this measure in part due to its sound theoretical basis. 
That is, in addition to capturing a construct that is independent from behavioral frequency, the 
measure appears to do just what we would expect a good measure of habit strength to do 
(Verplanken & Orbell, 2003)—it predicts future behavior (Study 1), correlates with other 
measures of habit strength such as response frequency (Study 2), and distinguishes between 
behaviors with different frequencies (Studies 3 and 4). In addition, it has been used to 
differentiate between frequency and habit strength by showing how a frequently-performed but 
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novel behavior increases in habit strength over time (Lally, Van Jaarsveld, Potts, & Wardle, 
2010). 
There may still be room for improvement in the measurement and application of the 
habits construct, however, as the SRHI has yielded mixed findings in the small number of 
intervention studies that have employed it. One intervention improved the exercise frequency of 
the children in the intervention group (relative to that of the control group), but this effect was 
not mediated by a change in habit strength as measured by the SRHI (Jurg, Kremers, Candel, 
Van Der Wal, & Meij, 2006). Similarly, an intervention to promote oral hygiene at school 
managed to increase tooth brushing without any apparent impact on SRHI habit strength (Wind, 
Kremers, Thijs, & Brug, 2005). 
Whereas this inconsistency may simply be the result of the unpredictable nature of the 
time needed for habit formation (Lally, et al., 2010), it does introduce the concern that the SRHI 
might not always be able to detect changes in habit strength. A reconsideration of the 
assumptions of the measure suggests why this might be. First, the prospect of asking participants 
to perform a self-report of the automaticity of their behaviors is a curious notion. Even aside 
from the self-presentation and social desirability biases that tend to plague self-report measures 
in general (Paulhus, 1984), there people have limited ability to identify influences on their 
behavior (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2008). 
Automatic influences may be especially difficult to detect, given that one of the hallmarks of the 
automaticity of a behavior is that its performance does not require conscious awareness 
(Verplanken & Orbell, 2003). 
In addition, the singular focus of the SRHI on automaticity may be problematic. 
Theoretically speaking, automaticity is not equivalent to habit strength, but rather is a 
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consequence of a high degree of habit strength. To illustrate the importance of this point, 
consider the example of two familiar behaviors: breathing and blinking. They are extremely 
frequent and extremely automatic, yet it seems somewhat inappropriate to label them as habits. 
For one, there seems to be no reasonable alternatives to performing these behaviors. But 
moreover, they appear to operate without the need for a central feature of the habits construct: a 
mental association with an environmental cue. The fact that these behaviors meet the criteria for 
habits set by the SRHI highlights the problem with neglecting the cue-behavior association. 
 Association. Currently, there is almost no existing empirical research that investigates 
the role of association in habit formation and expression. Since repetition (behavioral frequency) 
and automaticity (SRHI) are already well studied with regard to habits, I suggest that efforts to 
expand habit theory and research should focus next on association. To illustrate the importance 
of association, I will draw on work from other fields, in which its role is highlighted (see Table 1 
for an overview). 
 One field that is particularly well known and particularly useful in this endeavor is animal 
learning. Pavlov famously demonstrated that after repeated exposure to the sound of a bell 
followed by the presentation of food, a dog’s natural salivation in response to receiving food 
could be elicited upon merely hearing the bell. Pavlov’s early explanation centered on reflexes, 
and viewed the phenomenon in terms of shifting control between separate cues (Rescorla, 1988). 
In his terms, the control of an unconditioned stimulus (a naturally occurring cue, e.g., food) over 
a given unconditioned response (e.g., salivation) could shift to a conditioned stimulus (the 
experimentally imposed cue, e.g., a bell) given sufficient repetition of a pairing between the 
conditioned and unconditioned stimulus. Eventually, the presentation of the conditioned alone 
stimulus would elicit the unconditioned response, which would have thus transformed into the 
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conditioned response. Later explanations focused on associations, however, and viewed the 
phenomenon in terms of learning about relationships that exist between events in the 
environment (Rescorla, 1988). 
 Edward L. Thorndike, another central figure in psychological research on learning, 
developed the paradigm of the “puzzle box,” wherein animals trapped inside boxes gained 
freedom upon the completion of a specific behavior or set of behaviors, such as stepping on a 
lever (Thorndike, 2009). At first the criterion behavior occurred only at random, and typically 
only after a period of instinctual and ineffective behaviors (e.g., scratching at the door). With 
repetition, however, the animals would achieve freedom more and more quickly. Based on these 
findings, Thorndike developed the law of effect, which states that behaviors leading to a 
satisfactory outcome will be more likely to occur again in the given situation, and behaviors 
leading to an unpleasant outcome will be less likely to occur again in the given situation. Like 
Pavlov, Thorndike was able to shape animals’ behavior by imposing an association. Whereas 
Pavlov’s created associations between cues, Thorndike’s associations were between behaviors 
and outcomes. Using this paradigm, Thorndike was able to gain important insights into patterns 
of learning over time, and he developed these into a formal theory of learning. Several of this 
theory’s key propositions are important for habit theorizing. 
 Skinner expanded on the view of associative learning in his theory of operant 
conditioning (Skinner, 1938). In accordance with the law of effect, Skinner showed that animals 
tend to increase the frequency of behaviors that are followed by a reward, and decrease the 
frequency of behaviors that are followed by punishment. Further, by rewarding particular 
behaviors after the presentation of a cue, Skinner was able to condition animals to repeat certain 
behaviors, such as stepping on a lever; to modify the characteristics of behaviors, such as the 
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force or duration of stepping on the lever; and even to perform behaviors that would never occur 
spontaneously under natural circumstances, such as rolling a tiny bowling ball (Skinner, 1938, 
1958). Skinner and colleagues were thoroughly able to control and shape animal behavior merely 
by constructing and altering associations between behaviors and reinforcements. Findings such 
as these demonstrate the power of associations as determinants of behavior. 
 Note that the work of Pavlov, Thorndike, and Skinner stemmed from the behaviorist 
tradition. As such it focused on observable behaviors and tended to avoid assuming the presence 
or action of any internal processes—the “association” existed as a feature of the environment 
engineered by the experimenters, and “learning” existed in changes in behavior. Later, theories 
belonging to a cognitive tradition returned to associations and learning, and located these ideas at 
the center of human thinking. 
 For instance, one recurring feature of traditional cognitive theories is a “semantic 
network,” whereby concepts or “nodes,” are connected through associative links, and activation 
of one node spreads to connected notes as a function of the strength of connection (Smith & 
Semin, 2004). Systems such as these can theoretically account for both abstract, higher cognition 
and automatic responding. Notably, the perception of an environmental cue can automatically 
produce or alter a behavior with which it is mentally associated. In research on the ideomotor 
effect, for instance, Bargh and colleagues (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996) reported that 
participants who were primed with words such as “grey,” “Florida,” and “bingo” walked more 
slowly to the elevator after ostensible conclusion of the experiment. They concluded that 
activating stereotypes about old people automatically shaped behavior so as to conform with 
associated stereotypes (i.e., “old people walk slow”). The automatic, associative responding that 
appears in traditional cognitive theories and research is the same that forms the basis for habits. 
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 Alternative perspectives such as ecological and embodied theories of cognition have 
challenged many facets of traditional cognitive theories, including the existence of semantic 
networks, but retain an emphasis on associations and account for habits quite well. In particular, 
embodied theories such as the Perceptual Symbols System (Barsalou, 1999) and Grounded 
Cognition (Barsalou, 2008) cast perceptual and cognitive associations in a starring role. 
 This emphasis on association is evident in the embodied account of memory, thinking, 
and learning (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 
2005; Niedenthal, et al., 2009). Acting and interacting with the world creates patterns of neural 
activity within the brain’s perceptual and sensorimotor systems, or modal systems. These 
patterns are captured by conjunctive neurons, which combine inputs from multiple sources, and 
which exist in a hierarchical organization within brain regions known as convergence zones. 
Neural activation in this system is bi-directional, and the activation of a particular conjunctive 
neuron re-activates, the pattern of neurons in the modal systems. Due to the hierarchical 
structure, a relatively small number of conjunctive neurons can simulate a nearly infinite 
potential array of patterns. This reactivation, called simulation, forms the basis for all forms of 
cognition, including remembering, introspecting, considering ideas, and formulating action. 
 The same hierarchical structure accounts for learning, or the formation of knowledge. 
Encountering similar experiences over time activates similar (and overlapping) populations of 
conjunctive neurons, and these patterns are in turn captured by conjunctive neurons further up in 
the hierarchy. Information from the modal systems can therefore be integrated across multiple 
instances of encountering the same or similar experiences. For instance, for very young children, 
hearing and saying the word “dog” ties together multiple experiences of perceiving furriness, 
wagging tails, and excited licking. This process can lead to error in identifying an animal until a 
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child’s experiences are rich enough to allow him or her to distinguish such a creature from the 
one that has been called “cat.” Embodied theories of cognition thus give association a highly 
central role in the processes that are fundamental to human functioning: association is 
responsible (a) for the formation of knowledge, which is the currency of cognition, and (b) for 
simulation, the mode of action by which all cognition occurs. 
 In addition to highlighting the role of associations in cognition, ecological and embodied 
theories account for habits in an overt emphasis on the environmental context. A central feature 
in ecological theories of cognition, for instance, is a focus on affordances—opportunities for 
action that the physical or social environment offers to a person (Gibson, 1979). People perceive 
particular opportunities as a result of certain characteristics, called attunements, including their 
personal histories, psychological and emotional states, goals and motivations, and so on (Gibson, 
1979). 
 Attunements are also the result of human evolution. The theory of Socially Situated 
Cognition (Smith & Semin, 2004) posits that (a) cognition is for action, and (b) cognition is 
situated. That is, cognition evolved to guide organisms’ behavior in a way that is adaptive, 
contributing to its reproductive fitness. Because action necessarily takes place within and with 
regard to an environment, adaptive action must take the environment into account, and a system 
for guiding adaptive action (cognition) must therefore attend closely to the environment. This 
principle is illustrated in the ability of environmental factors to influence cognition. For instance, 
people define themselves in terms of their characteristics that are distinct in a given environment 
(McGuire & McGuire, 1986)—for instance, a Black woman might see herself as Black when 
surrounded by White women, and see herself as a woman when surrounded by Black men. Self-
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perception, a fundamental feature of human cognition (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 
1994), operates with respect to a frame of reference that is defined by the environment.  
 The environment can also heavily influence the cognition responsible for the production 
of spontaneous behavior. For instance, studies on the chameleon effect (Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999) have demonstrated that people unconsciously change their nonverbal communication 
behaviors to mimic those of interaction partners. In sum, theoretical and empirical research from 
an ecological perspective stresses the idea that cognitive mechanisms have evolved to be 
sensitive to the environment. 
 From an ecological perspective, not only does cognition change with respect to the 
environment, but also it relies upon and even includes the environment. The theory of Socially 
Situated Cognition (Smith & Semin, 2004) also holds that that cognition is distributed—it is can 
be offloaded onto physical objects and shared between people. For instance, a human can use a 
calculator to perform part of the cognition necessary for a difficult math problem. Likewise, the 
cognition necessary to operate a large ship is too much for any one person to perform, and must 
therefore be divided between the crew members, each of whom performs a different task (Smith 
& Semin, 2004). In turn, joint action such as this requires further distributed cognition, such as 
using language, devising a system for dividing and coordinating tasks, and reaching a shared 
perception of reality (Caporael, 1997). In sum, ecological theories of cognition (a) stress that 
cognitive mechanisms are designed specifically to attend to the environment, and (b) include the 
environment as an active participant in cognition. In sum, the ecological perspective is useful for 
habit theory in that it supports a strong focus on the environment as both a determinant of the 
course of thought and action and a constituent of the processes for thinking and acting. 
Synthesis 
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 To review, habit-relevant concepts permeate many different areas of inquiry throughout 
the history of psychology. Though direct research on habits has had a contentious record, 
recently there has been considerable progress toward a distinct identity for the habit construct. In 
particular, many studies have elaborated the role of repetition and automaticity in habits. There 
seems to be a consensus that psychological association with contextual features plays an 
important role in habit processes, but there remains a lack of attention to defining what the 
important context is (and to see whether elements of context matter), and how associations 
translate the perception of contextual cues into habitual action. 
The Need for Further Habit Research 
 Why Are Habits Important? Habits can be powerful determinants of health behaviors. 
There is plentiful evidence that habits are an important determinant of behavior in general. First, 
habits seem to influence a large number of different behaviors. For example, a daily diary study 
of college students (Wood, Quinn, & Kashy, 2002) found evidence for habitual behavior in every 
facet of life investigated, including work for school and employment, entertainment and leisure, 
social interaction, eating and drinking, hygiene, transportation, sleeping, exercise, and cleaning. 
Not only did habits appear to play a role in a large variety of behaviors, but also a large 
proportion of all behaviors performed. The researchers reported that nearly half of all of 
participants’ actions were performed frequently, in a stable context, without thought, and noted 
that this result was likely an underestimation of the prevalence of habitual behavior in daily life. 
Indeed, by some estimates 95% of all behaviors are performed in a non-deliberative, thoughtless 
manner (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Thus, to the degree that habits can be identified as behaviors 
that are frequent (Ouellette & Wood, 1998), performed in stable contexts (Webb & Sheeran, 
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2003), and are somewhat automatic (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003), evidence suggests that the 
influence of habits is far reaching. 
 Perhaps even more convincingly, habits can produce behavior that is directly contrary to 
intentions. This effect often appears when people first acquire the intention to change an oft-
repeated behavior. A study of social smokers, for instance, revealed that for pub-goers, a strong 
habit of smoking in a pub preceded inadvertently lighting up in a pub even after newly-enacted 
laws banned smoking in pubs (Orbell & Verplanken, 2010). Similarly, participants with strong 
habitual tendencies to purchase fast food and watch television were unable to discontinue these 
behaviors in spite of possessing strong intentions to do so (Ji & Wood, 2007). These effects are 
by no means isolated—a meta-analysis of intention-behavior relations found that a change in 
intentions was insufficient to produce changes in behaviors that are frequent and occur in a stable 
context (Webb & Sheeran, 2006). Apparently, even wanting and meaning to behave in a 
particular way is insufficient when habits are well formed. 
 Habits Are Under-Used in Health Research. In spite of the evidence suggesting that 
habits play an important role in many health behaviors, the concept of the “habit” remains 
severely under-used in health behavior change research. To illustrate this, consider the health 
behavior of adherence to HIV medication. It is (ideally) performed frequently and in a stable 
context, and therefore is likely subject to the influence of habit. It is also important not only for 
optimizing patient outcomes, but also for preventing the development of drug-resistant strains 
(Chesney, Ickovics, Hecht, Sikipa, & Rabkin, 1999) and for reducing the transmission of the 
virus (Metzger, Woody, & O’Brien, 2010). A search through the most highly cited scholarly 
reviews of HIV adherence research reveals that, in spite of their apparent power as a determinant 
of behavior, habits are almost entirely absent in the literature. For example, although Bangsberg 
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(2008) notes that, “the best predictor of future adherence is past adherence,” he makes no 
mention of habits or any related constructs (cues, automaticity, etc.). Likewise, Rueda and 
colleagues (2006) point out that cues for remembering are important for adherence but do not 
mention habits at all. A review by Simoni and colleagues (Simoni, Pearson, Pantalone, Marks, & 
Crepaz, 2006) provides one mention of habits, and another by Haynes and colleagues (Haynes, 
Ackloo, Sahota, McDonald, & Yao, 2008) provides two. 
 A handful of studies do appear to offer a treatment of habits that is congruent with 
psychological theorizing. For example, one correlational study found that good adherence is 
positively associated with strong routines for socialization, sleeping, eating breakfast, having 
meetings to attend, and having a favorite television show to watch every day (Wagner & Ryan, 
2004). This finding is consistent with the habit hypothesis that habitual behaviors are best 
learned when repeated in a stable context. 
 Two successful interventions (Haynes et al., 2008; Peterson, McLean, & Millingen, 
1984) include the technique of structuring the patient’s pill-taking regimen around his or her 
daily habits. This strategy aligns with the notion that habitual behaviors are best learned in a 
stable environment. Another successful intervention reports that one of its goals was to 
encourage the acquisition of habits and the development of automaticity (Tuldrá et al., 2000). 
This goal seems to derive naturally from the hypothesis that habits, as automatic behaviors, are 
mentally efficient (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003) and thus less vulnerable than nonhabitual 
behaviors to disruption from competing life demands. This prediction was also supported by a 
study that found that the automaticity of self-administering asthma medication predicted 
adherence at follow-up (Bolman, Arwert, & Völlink, 2010) 
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 Although these studies demonstrate the utility of the habit construct and provide 
preliminary support for the importance of habits in medication adherence, the body of evidence 
along this line is still in its early stages. For example, the two studies that provide the most 
thorough discussion of the habit construct are limited by their correlational designs (Bolman, et 
al., 2010; Wagner & Ryan, 2004). The three studies that do use a manipulation do not provide 
the details of the manipulation, do not discuss or even mention habits as a theoretical construct, 
and obscure the contribution of the habit-based component by including other intervention 
strategies (Haynes, Sackett, & Gibson, 1976; Peterson, et al., 1984; Tuldrá, et al., 2000). 
 The field of HIV adherence intervention could indeed benefit from an increased focus on 
habits as a psychological construct. Reviews of the efficacy of adherence interventions suggest 
that even the best interventions do not work nearly as well as we would like them to (Haynes, et 
al., 2008). One important contribution of the habits construct may be to help explain why this is 
so. While interventions based on traditional models of behavior and behavior change—such as 
the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991), the Transtheoretical Model (Prochaska & 
Velicer, 1997), and the Information, Motivation, Behavioral Skills model (Fisher & Fisher, 
1992)—tend to focus on convincing and motivating people to change their behaviors, there is 
evidence that this is not always the best approach. As mentioned before, a review by Webb and 
Sheeran (2006) of behavior change interventions suggested that habitual behaviors are not 
subject to an individual’s deliberate attempt to change, regardless of how convinced or motivated 
he or she is. 
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The Present Research 
Target Behaviors 
 Flossing, is an ideal choice for studying habits. Dental professionals recommend it for all 
people (Lindhe, Lang, & Karring, 2009), barring rare contraindications, which allows for the 
sampling of a very large population. Previous research has demonstrated that flossing is subject 
to the influence of habit, but there is still a great degree of variance in the degree to which people 
adhere to the recommended daily regimen (Judah et al., 2012; Orbell & Verplanken, 2010). 
Consequently, we expect that our participants will indeed have flossing habits that we may 
attempt to analyze and predict, but that there will not be a ceiling or floor effect in terms of habit 
strength and behavioral frequency. In addition, flossing offers important health benefits. Previous 
research indicates that flossing helps prevent gum disease (Sjogren, Lundberg, Birkhed, 
Dudgeon, & Johnson, 2004) and even provides some degree of protection against cardiovascular 
disease (Wu et al., 2000). The first two studies, therefore, focus on flossing as a target behavior. 
The third study, because it is a meta-analysis, includes all behaviors that have been studied in the 
habit literature in terms of self-reported automaticity. 
Study	Overview 	 Study	1	is	an	experiment	designed	to	test	the	mental	habit	association	in	the	context	of	flossing.	As	part	of	a	word-completion	task,	I	primed	participants	with	a	randomly	assigned	number	of	cues	that	reflect	the	typical	flossing	environment,	and	assessed	whether	this	caused	them	to	complete	an	ambiguous	word	stem	as	“floss.”	The	study	also	assessed	participants’	flossing	habits	in	terms	of	how	frequently	they	floss,	how	automatically	they	floss,	how	consistently	they	floss	in	the	same	environment,	and	how	good	and	bad	it	feels	when	they	floss.		
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 Study 2 is a test of a new measure of habit strength. I used the Implicit Association Test 
to measure the degree to which participants associate flossing with the features of the 
environment in which they floss. I created a new version of the IAT specifically for habit 
strength, which requires participants to customize the task by selecting the cues that are relevant 
to the context of their particular habit. This study also included measures of flossing frequency 
and automaticity. 
 Study 3 is a meta-analysis of the habit literature across multiple behaviors. I compiled 
data on the habit-behavior relationship from all studies that reported both habit strength (as 
measured in terms of behavioral automaticity) and behavior (as measured in terms of frequency, 
volume, or similar). I also conducted my own survey, wherein participants rated the various 
behaviors from the meta-analysis in terms of the consistency of the context in which they do 
them, the good and bad feelings that accompany their performance, and the frequency of their 
performance. Using meta-analytic regression, I explored how these variables, along with the 
characteristics of the samples in my meta-analysis, predicted the strength of the relationship 
between habit and behavior. 
Research Goals 
 1. Searching for the mental association in habit. Thus far, in the course of conducting 
the above meta-analysis, I have uncovered no primary empirical evidence that mental 
associations underlie habits. Consequently, an intriguing question arises: Can we detect the 
presence of habits through mere mental associations? The first step, in Study 1, is a proof of 
concept to demonstrate that a mental association does indeed accompany a habit (even if it is not 
necessarily responsible for causing the habitual behavior). The second step, in Study 2, is to 
attempt to directly measure this association. If successful, the fulfillment of these steps would 
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provide both a validation of a key assumption of habit theory, and a useful measure of habit 
strength for future research. 
 2. Expanding the repertoire of habit constructs. Habit research from classic 
psychology measured habit primarily in terms of frequency. Recently, the habit literature has 
grown rapidly due to the introduction of the Self Report Habit Index (Verplanken & Orbell, 
2003), which provided researchers a standardized and easily adaptable tool for measuring habit 
in terms of behavioral automaticity. Consequently, frequency and behavioral automaticity—two 
constructs that are central to habit theory—have been very well demonstrated in the empirical 
literature. Other constructs, though implied or even specified in common theorizing on habits, 
have received far less attention. Among these is the stability of the context in which the behavior 
is performed. During habit formation, a stable context is thought to facilitate the learning of the 
cue-behavior association. Once the habit is formed, consistently encountering the context that 
contains the key habit cues is thought to lead to consistent performance of the habitual behavior. 
So far, however, previous research has largely ignored the context of the behavior altogether. 
 As part of my research goals, therefore, I aim to evaluate the hypothesis of contextual 
stability as a test of the predictions of habit theory and as an effort to provide new tools for 
future habit research. In Study 1, I will employ a new measure designed to capture the stability 
of the context in which participants floss. I expect to find more stable flossing contexts will 
accompany stronger flossing habits. In Study 3, I will adapt this measure for the behaviors that 
appear most frequently in my meta-analysis. I expect to find that behaviors with higher 
contextual stability will tend to have high effect sizes for the habit-behavior relationship. 
 A second habit theory construct that has seen little use is the effect of a behavior’s 
intrinsic rewards and punishments. In the classic associative learning literature, reinforcement is 
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used to shape behavior by rewarding some responses and punishing others. Among adult 
humans, most behaviors that we study as habits are not typically subject to this manner of 
instant, externally imposed reinforcement. Nonetheless, habit theory would predict that such 
behaviors are still shaped by the same processes: Outcomes that feel good tend to increase the 
associated response, and outcomes that feel bad tend to decrease it. Rather than being rewarded 
or punished (in the most immediate sense), we tend to simply experience behaviors as being 
rewarding or punishing. One might interpret this as a process of natural reinforcement. This may 
be an important consideration for the application of habit theory. Behaviors that are pleasant or 
that bring a person good feeling are likely to form into habits very easily, and these habits are 
likely to be hard to break. Behaviors that are naturally unpleasant may take much more deliberate 
effort to form into habits, and more care must be taken to maintain the habit. 
 As part of my research goals, therefore, I attempt to measure and explore this natural 
reinforcement. In Study 1, I introduce a new measure of natural reinforcement in flossing and 
test its relationship to flossing habit strength. Based on the predictions of habit theory, I 
hypothesize that more positive levels of natural reinforcement will predict high habit strength. In 
Study 3, I assess the natural reinforcement of the various behaviors in my meta-analysis. Here, I 
hypothesize that more positive levels of natural reinforcement will predict a larger habit-behavior 
relationship effect size. In both studies, I expect natural reinforcement to interact with contextual 
stability in the production and expression of habit. 
 3. Testing person-level variables: age and gender. Habits are often highly 
personalized. Even though people have habits for the many of the same behaviors, the details of 
each person’s habit is particular to the life from which it arises, and of which it is a part. The 
cues that are relevant to each person’s habit are those that are found in his or her immediate 
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environment. The associations that drive each person’s habit are those that formed over the 
course of his or her unique experiences. Although as social psychologists, we often set out to 
understand how phenomena operate in a way that is true of all people, the ability to make sense 
of idiosyncratic behavioral processes is of great use to us as health psychologists in tailoring and 
targeting interventions. For example, we would never give the same nutrition and exercise 
intervention to a class of 5th grade girls and to a cohort of retired veterans at the VFW. 
 Habit studies tend to report basic demographic variables such as gender and age, yet 
rarely include them in their analyses or examine their roles as meaningful habit constructs. My 
research goals include an effort to change (or at least to oppose), this trend. In Study 1, 2, and 3, 
I will include age and gender in my measurements and analyses. Previous research has suggested 
at least a tentative link between gender and habit-relevant aspects of personality—women have 
scored higher on certain sub-scales of conscientiousness, such as orderliness (Weisberg et al., 
2011) and self-discipline (Costa et al., 2001), although they have not scored higher on 
conscientiousness overall. We therefore predict that women in my sample will report a higher 
flossing automaticity than men. In addition, we predict an interaction between age and gender 
such that gender differences in behavioral automaticity will decrease with age. Previous research 
has demonstrated an increase in conscientiousness among men over the lifespan, and a slight 
decrease among women (Weisberg et al., 2011). The hypothesized interaction could also result 
from a ceiling effect, whereby the men simply catch up to the women over time. 
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Study 1: Testing for the Cue-Behavior Association, 
Contextual Stability, and Natural Reinforcement 
 To date, the great bulk of empirical research on habits in health psychology has focused 
on two theoretical components: behavioral frequency and automaticity. We aim to gather 
evidence relating to a variety of other, relatively under-explored components, including cue-
behavior association, contextual stability, and natural reinforcement. My first study examines 
these theoretical facets in the context of flossing. In addition to the standard measures of 
frequency and automaticity, we use a word completion task to prime contextual cues and test 
their association with flossing, and we employ new measures to assess contextual stability and 
natural reinforcement. 
Hypotheses 
 Mental association. In support of the view of habits as cue-behavior associations, we 
predict an interaction such that the effect of the context-priming manipulation on the cognitive 
availability of flossing should be more pronounced among those who report greater flossing 
automaticity. 
 Contributors to automaticity. In support of the hypothesized roles of frequency, 
stability, and natural reinforcement, we predict that these three components will not only 
contribute directly to automaticity, but will demonstrate a nuanced 3-way interaction. The effect 
of frequency on automaticity should be greater in cases of higher contextual stability, yet this 
pattern should be less visible in cases of lower natural reinforcement due to the overpowering 
effect of a behavior’s highly appetitive or highly aversive consequences. 
 Gender and age. In the interest of using this research to inform and tailor health 
behavior change efforts, we are also interested in the effects of demographic variables. As 
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detailed in the introduction, I expect to find a main effect of gender and age, as well as an 
interaction between the two. 
Method 
 Participants. Participants entered the experiment by signing up for an activity called 
“Word Game and Short Survey” on www.mturk.com, a website that allows users to complete 
tasks in exchange for money. The sample of 227 included 110 men and 117 women, who ranged 
in age from 18 to 69 (M=34.93, SD=11.60), and was 80.62% Caucasian (n=183), 6.61% African-
American or Black (n=15), 6.61% Hispanic of Latino (n=15), 7.05% Asian (n=16), 2.20% 
American Indian or Alaskan Native (n=5), 0.88% Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (n=2), and 
0.44% “Other” (n=1). 
 Procedure. Word Completion. After reading an IRB info sheet and indicating consent, 
participants began the study, which consisted of an online questionnaire. The first activity was a 
word completion task, in which participants responded to a series of 10 word stems (e.g., 
“__ARAGE”) by providing the missing first letter (e.g., “G”) as quickly as possible. The first 5 
stems gave participants a chance to familiarize themselves with the game, and had no possible 
solutions directly relating to flossing or bathrooms. Next, participants completed a series of 4 
stems consisting of a mix of bathroom-specific fixtures (e.g., “__OILET”) and general-
household items (e.g., “__TOVE”). The particular number of bathroom-specific stems was 
randomly assigned from 0 to 4, and any remaining slots in the series contained general-
household stems. Last, participants completed the stem, “__LOSS” which has the possible 
solutions of “FLOSS” or “GLOSS.” 
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 Frequency and location. Participants indicated the number of times that they floss over 
the course of an average week, as well as the proportion of times that they floss in the bathroom 
in particular. 
 Automaticity (SRHI). Participants completed a version of the Self Report Habit-Strength 
Index (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003), in which they used a slider bar to rate their agreement with 
12 statements such as, “Flossing is something I do without having to consciously remember” on 
a continuous scale from 0 to 100 (see Appendix B for full measure).  
 TACT Stability. Participants rated the consistency with which they tend to floss (a) at the 
same times of day, (b) on the same days of the week, (c) for the same amounts of time, (d) in the 
same particular manner, (e) in the same locations, (f) with the same people (who are also doing 
the behavior), (g) around the same people (who are not doing the behavior), and (h) using the 
same objects or items. We selected these questions in order to reflect Ajzen’s set of facets that 
comprise a fully specified behavior: time, action, context, and target (TACT). Responses were 
given using a slider from 0 (disagree strongly) to 100 (agree strongly), and were averaged to 
represent the overall stability of the participants’ flossing habits, with higher values indicating 
greater stability. 
 Natural reinforcement. Participants responded to a series of questions about the feelings 
that they experience as a result of flossing, and as a result of not flossing. These included both 
physical and emotional feelings separately, and also included both good and bad feelings 
separately. Responses were given using a slider from 0 (disagree strongly) to 100 (agree 
strongly). We combined them by adding the good feelings of doing the behavior, subtracting the 
bad feelings of doing the behavior, subtracting the good feelings of not doing the behavior, and 
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adding the bad feelings of not doing the behavior. Thus, a higher value for this variable indicated 
a natural reinforcement in favor repeating the behavior.  
 Demographics. Participants indicated their age, gender, and race. 
 Attention check. The last question served as a safeguard against the possibility that some 
participants might fill in random answers or fail to read and follow directions. The ostensible 
question text asked participants to choose their favorite ice cream flavor from a list, but a 
paragraph of instructions that preceded the question asked them to leave it blank. Participants 
who selected an ice cream flavor were to be excluded from the analysis, however all participants 
followed the instructions and left the question blank. 
Results 
 There were no participants who met my exclusion criteria (giving nonsensical answers or 
failing the attention check), so my final sample included all 227 of the participants. There were 
846 missing values (between 53 participants), which were excluded list wise from the relevant 
analyses. Due to the random assignment, the sample size for each condition (0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 
primes) were 52, 45, 48, 44, and 39, respectively. Based on a multivariate analysis of variance, 
these groups did not appear to differ significantly in terms of any of the conceptual or 
demographic variables that we recorded (see Table 2). Overall 65.37% of participants completed 
“__LOSS” as “FLOSS.” The average habit strength was 38.32 (of 100), and the average flossing 
frequency was 4.42 times per week (see Table 3 for full descriptive statistics and correlations). 
Both the SRHI and the contextual stability measures demonstrated good reliability (α =.973 and 
0.826, respectively), but the natural reinforcement measure demonstrated poor reliability, 
α=.575. 
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Table 2: MANOVA Comparing Study Variables across Priming Groups 
  F(df) p 
Automaticity (SRHI) 0.94 (4,187) .44 
Flossing Frequency 1.38 (4,187) .24 
Contextual Stability 1.39 (4,187) .24 
Natural 
Reinforcement 0.51 (4,187) .73 
Age 1.73 (4,187) .14 
Gender 2.20 (4,187) .07 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for Study 1 variables. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Completed “FLOSS”         
2. # of Primes .06         
3. SRHI .04 -.09        
4. Frequency .01 -.12 .70       
5. % in Bathroom -.03 .03 -.05 -.12      
6. Stability .05 -.03 .49 .40 .34     
7. Reinforcement -.03 -.09 .56 .48 -.02 .38    
8. Age -.22 -.07 .17 .15 -.09 .12 .11   
9. Gender 
   (f=0, m=1) 
-.09 -.15 .08 .13 .00 .04 .13 .12  
Mean .65 1.88 38.32 4.42 81.86 61.60 15.01 34.93 1.52 
SD .48 1.41 32.09 4.72 28.60 23.38 13.92 11.60 0.50 
Note. Boldface correlations achieved conventional statistical significance (p<.05). 
 
 To evaluate the cognitive availability of “floss,” we performed a logistic regression on 
participants’ completion of the target word stem as “floss” instead of “gloss.” The model used 
participants’ level of bathroom priming, SRHI, age, and gender as predictors. We also included 
the interaction between priming and SRHI to test whether sensitivity to the prime varied by 
flossing automaticity. We controlled for the percent of instances that participants flossed inside 
the bathroom (as opposed to in other places) because we did not expect the prime to successfully 
elicit the concept of floss in participants who flossed mainly outside the bathroom. We also 
controlled for flossing frequency in order to account for any associations with my theoretical 
predictors. 
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 We found no significant main effects for bathroom priming, SRHI, gender, percent 
flossing in the bathroom, or flossing frequency (see Table 4). There was also no significant 
interaction between the effects of bathroom prime and SRHI. We did find a significant main 
effect for age, such that participants’ likelihood of completing “floss” increased with age. The 
Nagelkerke R2 for the model was .121. 
Table 4: Logistic regression predicting the word stem completion as “floss.” 
 b SE(b)  β t p 
Bathroom prime 0.083 .115 0.03 0.74 .47 
Flossing SRHI 0.010 .007 0.05 0.98 .17 
Flossing Frequency -0.010 .046 0.00 0.02 .83 
Flossing % in Bathroom -0.004 .006 -0.02 0.58 .49 
Age -0.040 .014 -0.12 3.12 <.01 
Gender -0.509 .323 -0.01 0.18 .12 
Prime × SRHI 0.000 .004 0.00 0.04 .96 
Intercept 2.688 .943   3.12 <.01 
Notes: N=228, degrees of freedom=220 for all t-values. 
 
 To evaluate flossing automaticity, we used a multiple linear regression to predict SRHI 
score from flossing frequency, TACT stability, internal reinforcement, age, and gender 
(including a 2-way interaction between age and gender, and a 3-way interaction between 
frequency, TACT stability, and internal reinforcement). We also controlled for the number of 
bathroom word primes that participants encountered. There was a significant main effect for 
frequency, TACT stability, and natural reinforcement, but no significant interactions between the 
effects thereof (see Table 5). There were no significant main effects for age or gender (ß=.083, 
p=.19). There was, however there was a significant interaction between their effects, such that 
the general increase in automaticity with age was smaller for women than for men. There was no 
significant main effect for bathroom priming. The R2 for the model was.761. 
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 From a theoretical standpoint, my null finding could also signal a need to further question 
the nature of the cue-behavior association. We had expected, for example, that a person who 
habitually flosses in his bathroom, upon looking about this bathroom, might experience the 
activation of the concepts of “toothbrush” and “sink.” These concepts, by means of the mental 
association in question, would then activate the concept of “flossing,” and in turn, the behavioral 
schema for flossing. Instead, it is possible that the route from the perception of the cue to the 
performance of the behavior is more direct, entirely bypassing the mechanism of semantic 
concept activation. This would certainly be in concordance with the thinking that habits are 
mentally efficient. It would also be in concordance with the results of my study: If the sequence 
of seeing a bathroom and then flossing does not also involve the ideas of “bathroom” and 
“flossing,” then there is no reason to expect that a person who flosses each night would associate 
these ideas any more strongly than a person who flosses only very occasionally.  
 Further research is needed to clarify the precise nature and action of the cue-behavior 
association, including any role that semantic activation might serve. Studies in this line of 
inquiry would need to compare the associations as enacted through word-based tasks with those 
expressed as actual behavior. It may be also necessary to move beyond an internet or even 
laboratory setting and conduct such studies in situ, using the actual habit environment—rather 
than depictions thereof—to elicit the behavior. 
 Automaticity. We found support for some of my hypotheses regarding the factors that 
contribute to behavioral automaticity. Beyond frequency, which is the most well demonstrated 
component of habit theory, we found evidence that people with strong flossing habits typically 
floss in a more stable context and seem to enjoy the experience of flossing more than do those 
with weak flossing habits. These results fall directly in line with the predictions of research on 
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Table 5: Logistic regression predicting SRHI. 
  b SE(b)  β t p 
Bathroom Prime -0.260 1.114 -0.012 -0.23 .82 
Flossing Frequency 3.880 0.504 0.578 7.71 .00 
Contextual Stability 0.267 0.086 0.191 3.12 .00 
Natural Reinforcement 0.601 0.143 0.260 4.19 .00 
Age 0.082 0.142 0.029 0.58 .56 
Gender 4.814 4.070 0.076 1.18 .24 
Age × Gender 0.371 0.139 0.167 2.67 .01 
Frequency × Stability -0.016 0.025 -0.047 -0.65 .51 
Frequency × 
Reinforcement -0.042 0.034 -0.107 -1.25 .21 
Stability × Reinforcement 0.005 0.007 0.046 0.72 .47 
Frequency × Stability × 
Reinforcement 
-0.001 0.001 -0.065 -0.76 .45 
Intercept -11.040 9.627   -1.15 .25 
Notes: N=192, degrees of freedom=184 for all t. 
 
Discussion 
 Mental association. In my experiment, we found that exposure to bathroom-related 
words did not make people more likely to think of floss, regardless of the strength of their 
flossing habit. More generally speaking, we found no evidence to support or clarify the view of 
habits as cue-behavior associations. We also found no evidence that gender or age play a role in 
the action or expression of such an association. There are a number of explanations for this null 
effect from a methodological standpoint. Perhaps the forced contemplation of bathroom-related 
words, even in combination, was not sufficient to successfully activate the more general 
“bathroom” concept. Any future study on habits using similar methods would benefit from a 
manipulation check. Perhaps this general “bathroom” concept is not the crucial one, but rather a 
more specific “my bathroom” concept. Future, similar studies might take steps to ensure that 
participants call to mind their own bathrooms, or even utilize pictures of participants’ actual 
bathrooms as primes. 
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associative learning, and in doing so, tend to support the view of habits as mental associations. In 
addition, they provide support for the use of these concepts and measurement instruments in 
future research. My confidence in the utility of the natural reinforcement construct is limited by 
its mediocre reliability. It is not clear that the various pleasant and unpleasant consequences of a 
habitual behavior should be combined into a single index, although we were unable to 
substantially improve the reliability by dissecting them into subscales. Given the construct’s 
demonstrated effect, however, it certainly appears to warrant further investigation. 
 We did not find that the effects of frequency, stability, and natural reinforcement 
interacted as we had predicted, and further research is needed into relationship between these 
constructs and their effects on automaticity. In addition, evidence beyond my own correlational 
data is needed to establish causality. Future studies might attempt to observe the effect that 
manipulating frequency, stability, and natural reinforcement has on automaticity, as well as vice 
versa. 
 Gender and age. We found mixed support for my hypotheses regarding the role of 
demographic variables. While older people did not appear to have stronger flossing habits than 
younger people, nor women than men, we were able to observe a difference between men and 
women in terms of their flossing habit trajectory across the various ages represented in my 
sample. It appeared that, for men, flossing habit increases with age more than it does for women. 
Because my data on this effect are correlational, we are unable to determine if the role of age 
derives from developmental effects or cohort effects. The use of a longitudinal design in future 
research could shed light on this question. In addition, although we proposed that gendered 
differences in habit stem from gendered differences in personality traits, this explanation is 
purely speculative. Future research is needed to test any relationship between habits and various 
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personality characteristics, as well as any gender and age differences that these characteristics 
might exhibit. 
 Conclusion. Overall, my study furnished mixed support for a key role of the environment 
in habits. We were not able to detect it with a word-based experimental task, but we did see that 
it contributes to a stew of ingredients, the combination of which contributes to the production of 
automaticity. Although my study dealt only with flossing, the use of my constructs of interest in 
exploring other behaviors and interpreting the differences between them may teach us a great 
deal about the general structure of habits. 
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Study 2: An Implicit Measure of Habit? 
 Improving measures of habit strength has been a key factor in advancing the habit 
research literature. The SRHI, for instance, has allowed researchers to measure habit strength 
beyond mere behavioral frequency, and has enabled a deeper exploration of the mechanics habit 
acquisition and performance. We propose that a new measure of habit strength could unlock 
further advancements in habit research by measuring the mental cue-behavior associations that 
are thought to act as the habit mechanism. Such a measure could serve as a complement to the 
SRHI, and may broaden my understanding of key habit processes in a number of ways. 
 First, as discussed previously, there remains much work to be done in painting a more 
comprehensive theoretical picture of habits as a psychological concept. The behavior is only half 
of the cue-behavior pairing that comprises a habit. A new measure should seek to reflect the 
environmental and contextual features that elicit the behavior. 
 A further possible benefit of measuring the full cue-behavior association is the ability to 
observe changes in habit on a more detailed time scale. Meaningful changes in behavioral 
automaticity tend to occur only with a great deal of repetition and time—often more time than a 
health behavior intervention is able to continue. By comparison, mental associations are thought 
to form and fluctuate with relative ease. Studies that demonstrate the efficacy of implementation 
intentions have proposed that mental associations—even those created only by one instance of 
filling out a worksheet or saying a sentence aloud—are capable of not only persisting in the 
mind, but even bringing about the desired behavior. And while a quick fluctuation in mental 
association does not alone make or break a habit, my efforts to change large-scale patterns of 
health behavior can only benefit from a greater understanding of their small-scale underpinnings 
and precursors. 
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 Finally, previous research has demonstrated that people do not necessarily possess 
accurate insight into the various forces that influence or even drive their behavior (Nolan et al., 
2008). This may be doubly true of automatic, habitual behaviors—those that by definition occur 
without the need for conscious awareness. An ideal new measure, therefore, should minimize the 
reliance of habit research on participants’ self-reporting. 
 One tool that may meet these benchmarks—incorporating environmental cues, reflecting 
fine-grained mental associations, and avoiding self-report—is the Implicit Association Test. The 
IAT has seen extensive use as a measure of mental association in social and health psychology. 
The IAT consists of a timed categorization task, wherein participants sort stimuli into paired 
categories (e.g. “White or Good” vs. “Black or Bad”) and then repeat the sorting with the 
category pairings reversed (e.g., “White or Bad” vs. “Black or Good”). Using this technique, the 
mental association in question should manifest as a difference in sorting performance between 
the two category pairing schemes—participants are expected to have more difficulty using a 
category pairing that contradicts any existing association they might have. For instance, if a 
participant has prejudice toward Black people, they already associate “black” with “bad,” and 
will therefore be able to sort stimuli more quickly into “Black or Bad” than “Black or Good.” 
The magnitude of this performance difference is thought to represent the strength of the existing 
mental association. 
 Although its most prominent use has been for the measurement of implicit attitudes, the 
structure of the test allows for the exploration of associations with mental constructs of any sort, 
not merely attitudes or positive and negative emotions. One previous study, for instance, gauged 
the self-relevance of cigarettes by measuring the association between cigarettes and participants’ 
names. Another study assessed gender stereotypes by measuring the association between women 
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and careers in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. If the IAT can indeed be used 
to measure the strength of association between mental concepts beyond attitudes and racial 
categories, then it may well be configured to measures the association between the mental 
concept of a behavior and mental concepts of its cues. Such a test would promise to gauge the 
very theoretical core of habits. 
 To create such an IAT for the present study, we needed to expand the test’s flexibility. 
Habits can be highly personalized, and the cues for any given behavior may vary greatly from 
one person to another. Consider, for instance, two people who both take the same medicine once 
a day. The one who takes it before bed might be cued by the feeling of drowsiness or the action 
of washing up, while the one who takes it at noon might be cued by an automatic text message 
reminder, or by the sight of co-workers leaving for lunch break. Even two people who take it at 
the same time of day are likely to have entirely different sets of cues, owing to the differences in 
the salient features of the immediate physical and social environments. In order to reflect this 
theoretical consideration, we programmed my IAT to customize itself for each user: Before 
beginning the IAT, participants view a list of potential cues and select the ones that best describe 
the context in which they perform the behavior of interest. The program then uses these items as 
stimuli in the IAT.  
 To make the best use of this feature, we sought to capture a wide range of cues by 
considering the various types, kinds, and modes of cues that have appeared in habit-relevant 
research. For instance, stimuli such as blinking lights and bells have been popular behavioral 
cues in associative learning trials, and important habit cues might therefore be expected to take 
the form of the visual or auditory features that are salient in the environment while the behavior 
is performed. Additionally, studies that have recorded participants’ full sets of daily behaviors 
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suggest that many habits exist within the structure of routines, which are sequences of behaviors. 
A third type of important cue, therefore, may be the other behaviors that typically precede and 
follow the habitual behavior of interest. Thus, we tested three different versions of my IAT, each 
using stimuli meant to evoke a different general type of potential habit cue: sights, sounds, and 
actions. 
Hypotheses 
 IAT as a measure of habit strength. We assess the suitability of this approach as a test 
of two hypotheses. First, if the IAT can be used as a valid measure of these mental associations, 
it should demonstrate some degree of convergence with the most commonly used measures of 
habit strength: the SRHI and behavioral frequency. Second, if the IAT indeed offers a tool that is 
useful in addition to the SRHI, its inclusion should improve the prediction of behavioral 
frequency from SRHI scores alone. 
 Demographic variables. As in Study 1, we also anticipate that demographic variables 
will relate to participants’ flossing habits. We expect that a being a woman and being older will 
both predict higher flossing frequency, and we hypothesize an interaction such that the gender 
difference diminishes with age. 
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Methods 
 Pilot Study. In order to create the stimuli for the experimental procedure, we recruited 
three samples from www.mturk.com and asked them to create lists in response to simple, open-
ended prompts. The first group (n=47) described behavioral sequences: 20 participants listed the 
activities that comprise their nightly routines (e.g., “put on pajamas,” “set the alarm”), 15 listed 
their weekday afternoon routines, and 12 listed their weekend afternoon routines. The second 
group (n=49) described visual features of their environments: 22 listed the objects in their 
bathrooms (e.g., “toilet,” “shower”), 14 listed the objects visible in their kitchens, and 13 listed 
the objects visible in their garages. The third group (n=79) described the sounds in their 
environments: 17 participants listed onomatopoeia corresponding to the noises that can be heard 
in their bathroom (e.g., “whoosh,” “hummm”), 21 listed the noises in their kitchens, 20 listed the 
noises in their workplaces, and 21 listed the noises of their grocery stores. From these various 
lists, we selected the most commonly occurring items to generate groups of stimuli representing 
potential flossing cues (45 nightly activities, 30 bathroom objects, 30 bathroom sounds), as well 
as groups of items for use as neutral, comparison stimuli (7 mid-day activities, 7 non-bathroom 
objects, and 7 non-bathroom sounds). 
 Participants. Participants entered the study by signing up to complete a task called 
“Sorting Game and Short Survey” on www.mturk.com and indicating their consent on an IRB 
information sheet. The sample of 657 included 260 men and 397 women who ranged in age from 
18 to 68 (M=34.57, SD=10.84), and was 84% Caucasian (n=555), 6.7% African-American or 
Black (n=44), 6.2% Hispanic of Latino (n=41), 5. 1% Asian (n=34), 0.6% American Indian or 
Alaskan Native (n=4), and 2.4% “Other” (n=16). 
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 Procedure. Stimulus Selection. Participants selected a group of items from one of the 
lists generated during the pilot study (either nightly routine activities, bathroom sights, and 
bathroom sounds). In the “activities” version of the procedure, participants chose the 7 actions 
that best corresponded to their own nightly routines. In the “sights” version, participants chose 
the 7 objects that best reflected the visual features of their own bathrooms. In the “sounds” 
version, participants chose the 7 onomatopoeia that best reflected the auditory features of their 
own bathrooms. In all versions, participants who selected more than 7 items were asked to 
choose the 7 that they felt were the most regular or important part of their daily experience. 
 Brief IAT. Participants completed a version of the Brief Implicit Association Test in 
which they sorted words and pictures into categories. The stimuli for all participants were 
pictures of (a) floss and people flossing, and (b) other items and their use (e.g., a man kicking a 
soccer ball), and participants sorted them into the categories of “Floss” and “NOT Floss.” The 
word stimuli varied by version, and consisted of (a) the 7 items that participants had selected 
earlier (nightly activities, bathroom sights, or bathroom sounds), and (b) the 7 items of matching 
type (Mid-day activities, non-bathroom sights, or non-bathroom sounds) that were most 
commonly listed during the pilot study. Participants sorted word stimuli into categories of 
“Nightly Routine” vs. “NOT Nightly Routine”, or “Bathroom” vs. “NOT Bathroom,” depending 
on the type of stimuli. 
 During the task, category labels were displayed on the left and right sides of the screen, 
and participants used the “e” and “i” computer keys to identify the target stimulus as belonging 
to the category on the left or right side, respectively. Participants repeated this procedure during 
multiple blocks of stimuli: (a) a practice sequence sorting words only, (b) a practice sequence 
sorting pictures only, (c) a practice sequence sorting words and pictures, (d) a test sequence 
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sorting both words and pictures, (e) a practice sequence sorting words with the left/right 
categories reversed, (f) a practice sequence with word categories left/right reversed but picture 
categories normal, (g) a test sequence of the same. The IAT software calculated the strength of 
participants’ mental association between “Nightly Routine” and “Floss” as the t-score for the 
difference in response times between the two test sequences (4 and 7). 
 SRHI. Participants completed a version of the Self Report Habit-Strength Index (SRHI), 
in which they used a slider bar (0 to 100) to rate their agreement with 12 statements about 
flossing (e.g., “flossing is something I do without having to think about it”). In this study, the 
SRHI demonstrated excellent reliability, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .970. 
 Frequency. Participants indicated how many times they flossed in the past week.
 Demographics. Participants indicated their age, gender, and all categories of race and 
ethnicity with which they identified. 
 Attention check. As in Study 1, the last question asked for participants’ favorite ice cream 
flavor, but was preceded by a paragraph instructing them to leave the question blank. 
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Results 
 From the original 769 participants, 49 failed the attention check and 40 selected too few 
stimuli to populate the IAT, leaving a final sample of 681. There were 122 missing values from 
104 participants, which we excluded pairwise for correlations and descriptive analyses, and 
listwise for the regression. In order to test the equivalence of the stimulus type subsamples, we 
performed a multivariate analysis of variance (see Table 6). We found that participants who took 
the “sights” version scored significantly higher on the IAT (M=6.72, SD=4.44) than did 
participants who took the “sounds” (M=6.36, SD=3.74) or “actions” (M=5.56, SD=4.34) 
versions, even though their SRHI scores were not significantly different. We also found a 
marginally significant gender imbalance, such that the proportion of males was higher in the 
“sounds” version (46%) than the “sights” (35%) or “actions” (39%) versions. 
 
Table 6: Multivariate ANOVA relating IAT stimulus type to Study 2 variables. 
  F(df) p 
Frequency 0.403 (2,670) .67 
SRHI 1.385 (2,670) .25 
IAT 4.981 (2,670) <.01 
Gender 2.622 (2,670) .07 
Age 1.449 (2,670) .24 
 
 To test the convergent validity of the IAT as a measure of habit strength, we correlated it 
with the most frequently used measures of habit strength: behavioral frequency and the SRHI. 
We found that IAT scores correlated negatively with both SRHI scores, and flossing frequency 
(see Table 7 for full correlation matrix). With regards to demographic variables, age correlated 
significantly with all three habit-strength measures (flossing frequency, SRHI, IAT), but gender 
did not correlate significantly with any of them. 
 
Table 7: Correlations, means, and standard deviations for Study 2 variables. 
	50		
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Frequency        
2. SRHI .81       
3. IAT -.10 -.11      
4. Stimulus: Sight .03 .06 .09     
5. Stimulus: Sound -.03 -.05 .03 -.44    
6. Male -.05 -.03 -.05 -.06 .08   
7. Age .13 .09 .13 .05 .03 -.10  
Mean 2.14 2.66 6.16 32.20% 28.60% 40.00% 34.44 
SD 1.97 1.18 4.23       10.79 
Note. Boldface correlations achieved conventional statistical significance (p<.05). 
 
 To test the ability of the IAT to make a contribution over and above the SRHI, we used a 
linear multiple regression to predict flossing frequency from SRHI score, IAT score, IAT 
stimulus type (dummy coded), age, gender, and an age by gender interaction term. We found 
significant positive main effects for SRHI score and for age, but no significant effects for IAT 
score or any other predictor (see Table 8). With regards to demographic variables, we found 
flossing frequency had a significant positive relationship with age but not gender, and that there 
was no significant interaction between the effects of age and gender. The R2 for the model was 
.665. 
Table 8: Linear regression predicting flossing frequency. 
     b    SE(b)    β     t   p 
SRHI 1.338 0.038 0.807 35.37 <.01 
IAT -0.008 0.011 -0.017 -0.72 .47 
Stimulus: Sight -0.019 0.106 -0.004 -0.18 .86 
Stimulus: Sound 0.084 0.109 0.019 0.77 .44 
Age 0.009 0.004 0.052 2.26 .02 
Gender -0.062 0.091 -0.015 -0.68 .50 
Age × Gender 0.006 0.009 0.017 0.75 .45 
Intercept -1.684 0.193 0.000 -8.74 <.01 
Note, N=673, degrees of freedom = 648 for all ts. 
Discussion 
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 IAT as a measure of habit strength. In this study, we found no evidence that my 
implicit association test can be used as a measure of habit strength. Nor did it demonstrate any 
convergent validity in correlation with the SRHI, and it added nothing to the prediction of 
behavior from the SRHI. In fact, participants’ IAT scores had a small negative correlation with 
behavioral frequency (the opposite of what would happen if the measure functioned as we 
intended). This pattern may be due to a correlation with age, as the effect disappeared when both 
IAT score and age were included in the regression predicting frequency. 
 From a methodological standpoint, there are many reasons why my IAT may not have 
successfully measured habit strength. Although we tested three different kinds of cues as stimuli, 
it is still possible that we failed to properly capture the cues that would be pertinent to 
participants’ real life habits. Perhaps the key cues are of some sort other than sights, sounds, or 
actions. Or perhaps written text is simply unable to represent the visual, auditory, and kinesthetic 
information that constitute them sufficiently. Any future attempts to use the IAT as a base for a 
habit strength measure might try to use actual pictures or sound recordings from the actual 
environments of their participants. It may also be advisable to test future participants in person, 
as the IAT is a very cognitively intensive task. Even though we screened out participants who 
were paid little attention to the instructions, this experiment—conducted as it was on the 
internet—could not guarantee that participants were free of distractions or concentrating 
sufficiently. 
 From a theoretical standpoint, the inability to detect the mental associations of a habit 
mirrors the results of Study 1, and aligns with the idea that such mental associations do not work 
by means of spreading activation through linked semantic concepts. As we previously noted, if 
the connection from the cue to the behavior does not pass through the ideas that represent the cue 
	52		
and behavior, there is no reason to expect to find an association between the words that represent 
the cue and behavior, even in the cases of the strongest habits. A second null finding is certainly 
not grounds for concluding that this idea is correct, but reinforces the idea that it is an important 
target for future inquiry. 
 Contributors to flossing frequency. As in many previous studies (see my meta-analysis 
for an overview), the SRHI demonstrated a good ability to predict behavior—in the case of this 
study, flossing frequency. We found that older participants flossed more frequently than did 
younger participants, which supported my hypothesis about age, however we found no support 
for my hypothesis about gender. Also, in contradiction with the findings of my first study, we 
found no interaction between age and gender. Overall, the support for the role of age and gender 
in my experiments remains mixed, and a more direct inquiry into their effects will most likely be 
required to fully understand them. 
 Conclusion. The implicit association test, at least as we formulated it in this experiment, 
did not make for a successful measure of flossing habit strength. The main contribution of this 
study seems to be that we have uncovered some strategies that do not work—a necessary step on 
a hopeful journey to uncovering one that does work. 
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Study 3: A Meta-Analysis of Multiple Habits 
 Whereas the present research has thus far been directed toward predicting the 
automaticity of a behavior (Study 1) or the performance of behavior (Study 2), another approach 
is to predict the relationship between the two. For any particular behavior, the strength of this 
relationship could reflect either: (a) the degree to which the performance of the behavior causes 
the development of automaticity, or (b) the degree to which automaticity tends to dictate the 
performance of the behavior. Most likely, both cases are valid interpretations of a causal cycle 
whereby the performance and automaticity of a behavior reinforce each other. In any case, it is 
likely useful to identify the behaviors for which this relationship is strongest. With regards to 
promoting health, we are interested in being able to target these behaviors for intervention with a 
habit-change approach. With regards to advancing psychological theory, we are interested in 
understanding what it is unique about these behaviors, the context in which they occur, and the 
people that perform them. 
 In addition, this undertaking expands my methodological approach, as it is particularly 
well suited to examination through secondary research. A previous meta-analysis of studies on 
habits in nutrition and physical activity (Gardner, de Bruijn, & Lally, 2011) estimated a mean 
habit-behavior correlation of .46 across 22 papers. In the present research, I aim to update 
Gardner and colleagues' meta-analysis, expand it to other behaviors, and leverage the literature's 
variety toward decoding the factors that determine the habit-behavior relationship. Observing a 
wide range of behaviors will better support the generalization of the my conclusions beyond 
habits of flossing in particular. It may be particularly useful in casting light on the interplay 
between the constructs that contribute to habit. As per my previous hypotheses regarding the 
nature and formation of habits, I expect to find: (a) main effects of frequency, contextual 
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stability, and natural reinforcement, (b) an interaction between the effects of these three, (c) main 
effects of gender and age, and (d) an interaction between the effects of these two. 
Method 
 Literature Search and Study Selection. First, we searched for articles in multiple online 
electronic databases through April 26, 2015. With Scopus and Web of Science, we used the 
citation tracking feature to locate studies citing the papers that introduced the SRHI and its 
derivatives. With PsycINFO, PsycArticles, Academic Search Premier, PubMed, and ProQuest, 
we searched all fields for the following terms: SRHI, SRBAI, HINT, “A Self-Report Index of 
Habit Strength,” “Self-Report Behavioural Automaticity Index,” “Self-Report Behavioral 
Automaticity Index,” “Habit Index of Negative Thinking.” Second, after screening articles for 
inclusion, we searched for additional sources by examining the list of works cited by each article 
and the list of works citing each article. Third, we searched manually in the past year’s records of 
the three journals in which we found the highest number of relevant results: Appetite, Psychology 
and Health, and Transportation. 
 Three raters evaluated studies for inclusion, and discrepancies were resolved through 
discussion. Eligible studies measured (a) the strength of habit for the behavior of interest using 
questions adapted from the SRHI, SRBAI, or HINT, and (b) the performance of the behavior of 
interest in terms of its frequency (e.g., number of times per week the participant flossed), volume 
(e.g., total minutes of exercise per week), proportion (e.g., percentage of snacks eaten that were 
fruits or vegetables), a dichotomous outcome (e.g., whether or not the participant applied 
sunscreen), or some composite thereof.  
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 Coding. Three raters recorded information from the studies concerning the article, the 
sample, and the design, and discrepancies were resolved through discussion. Article 
characteristics included (a) authors, (b) year of data collection, (c) publication status, and (d) 
behaviors of interest. Sample characteristics included (e) the mean habit strength for this 
behavior, (f) mean sample age, (g) percent of females in sample, and (h) country of data 
collection. Design characteristics included (i) the number of items used to measure habit 
strength, (j) whether behaviors were measured in terms of frequency, volume, proportion, yes/no, 
or combined index; (k) whether measurement was through self-report or observation, (l) the 
length of time between the measurement of habit and the measurement of behavior, (M) whether 
the participants were part of an intervention, and (n) whether the study specifically recruited 
participants who were already trying to change the behavior of interest (e.g., dieters). 
 Questionnaire for Additional Moderators. In addition, we sought to capture a fuller 
picture of the relevant behaviors and gather information that was of theoretical interest to my 
analysis but that did not appear in my sample of studies. To this end, we conducted my own 
survey; 104 participants recruited from Mechanical Turk rated the 20 behaviors that appeared 
most frequently in the literature: (a) exercise, (b) active commuting, (c) traveling by car, (d) 
eating fruits and vegetables, (e) eating unhealthy snacks, (f) eating seafood, (g) observing safety 
precautions while preparing food, (h) hand washing, (i) using sunscreen, (j) using condoms, (k) 
flossing, (l) taking prescription medication, (M) recycling, (n) depositing in savings, (o) utilizing 
IT support, (p) casual internet use, (q) drinking alcohol, (r) smoking, (s) texting while driving, 
and (t) sitting for prolonged periods. Participants rated each behavior in terms of frequency (1 
item), contextual stability (8 items), and natural reinforcement (8 items) using the same scales as 
described in Study 1. Table 9 displays scale reliabilities. 
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Table 9: Reliability (Cronbach’s α) of scales for moderator 
variables from external survey. 
Behavior Contextual Stability 
Natural 
Reinforcement 
Exercise .821 .663 
Fruits & Vegetables .809 .601 
Unhealthy Snacking .791 .508 
Alcohol Consumption .881 .467 
Internet Use .727 .523 
Smoking .894 .834 
Seafood Consumption .827 .765 
Food Safety Practices .856 .678 
Active Commuting .924 .462 
Hand Washing .672 .672 
IT Assistance Use .798 .712 
Car Use .876 .587 
Sunscreen Use .935 .515 
Prolonged Sitting .784 .713 
Flossing .692 .654 
Recycling .816 .672 
Savings Deposits .797 .661 
Condom Use .899 .605 
Medication Adherence .889 .581 
Texting & Driving .866 .727 
 
Analyses 
 Calculation of effect size and moderators. We chose to represent the main study 
outcomes in terms of Pearson’s r, such that a more positive value indicates a stronger positive 
relationship between habit and behavior. We selected this effect size index because the scales 
predominantly used for both habits and behaviors are inherently continuous, and because nearly 
all of the studies in my sample reported the habit-behavior relationship in terms of r. Two studies 
reported odds ratios, for which we calculated Cohen’s d, and then converted to r, following the 
steps described by Borenstein and colleagues (2009). One study reported a Spearman’s rank-
order correlation, which we transformed using Walker’s (2003) formula for converting between 
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tau, r, and rho. In all cases, we performed Fisher’s z transformation before analysis in order to 
stabilize the variance and correct for small sample sizes. We weighted all effect sizes by the 
inverse variance of the resulting z. Results were transformed back to r for display purposes. 
 For some studies, we were unable to calculate an effect size from the information in the 
published report. This occurred most commonly when the habit-behavior relationship was 
described as part of a multiple regression or structural equation model without reporting the full 
correlation matrix. In these cases, there was some indication of the habit-behavior relationship 
(e.g., a regression weight or path coefficient), but we had no way to separate it out from the 
particulars of the model (e.g., other independent variables, multi-level structure) so that it would 
correspond with the other effect sizes in my sample. We contacted the authors of 61 studies for 
which we were unable to calculate an effect size. For 21 studies, the authors provided sufficient 
information to calculate effect sizes. For four studies, the authors indicated that there were no 
usable statistics available. We were unable to reach the authors for 36 studies, which we 
excluded after multiple failed attempts.   
 We did not contact authors for further information about sample or design characteristics. 
In some instances, we were sometimes able to estimate a missing value, such as by using 20.5 as 
the mean age for a sample of otherwise unspecified university undergraduates. Otherwise, 
studies with missing moderator values were excluded listwise from relevant moderator analyses. 
Random-Effects Model. Effect sizes were modeled under the assumption of random 
effects, a choice that suits the goals of the meta-analysis because random effects assumptions (a) 
better support the generalization of the findings beyond my sample of studies, (b) better 
accommodate a large amount of heterogeneity that is not explained by sampling error, and (c) 
better minimize the outlier effects of studies that have much larger samples than the others (Card, 
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2012). For this model, we estimated the weighted mean effect size with a 95% confidence 
interval (CI), and calculated the lack of homogeneity in terms of I2. We evaluated publication 
bias by creating a contour-enhanced funnel plot (Peters et al., 2008) and by performing Egger’s 
(1997) regression test. We also used the trim and fill technique (Duval & Tweedie, 2000a; 
2000b) to estimate the number of missing studies. 
Mixed-effects models. In parallel, we used weighted multiple-regression under mixed-
effects assumptions to model the effects of my moderator variables. Because some of the effect 
sizes pertained to behaviors that we could not include in the external survey, my first mixed-
effects model included only moderator variables coded from the published reports: Mean sample 
age, percent female, length of habit strength scale, mean sample habit strength, time lag between 
habit strength and behavior measurement, whether the study was an intervention, whether the 
study recruited a sample that was already trying to modify the behavior, and dummy coded 
variables to indicate the study’s type of behavioral measure (observation or self-report) as well as 
its units (frequency, volume, proportion, dichotomous outcome, or composite). Also, as in 
Studies 1 and 2, we tested for an interaction between the effects of age and gender. The second 
mixed-effects model tested the moderator variables derived from my external survey, including 
typical behavioral frequency, contextual stability, and natural reinforcement. We also controlled 
for all predictors that demonstrated a statistically significant effect in the first mixed-effects 
model. 
For both mixed-effects models, we calculated a regression weight and 95% CI for each 
moderator, and we calculated the remaining, unexplained heterogeneity in terms of I2. We 
illustrated all significant continuous predictors using Johnson and Huedo-Medina’s (2011) 
moving constant technique, plotting the estimated mean effect size across various levels of the 
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moderator. This plot also demonstrates the moderator’s relationship with the estimate’s 
precision, and points to the value of the moderator at which the confidence interval crosses the x-
axis and the effect thus no longer reaches statistical significance. In addition, a moving constant 
plot allows the examination of the effect in question at levels of moderator variables extrapolated 
beyond the range of values that are present in the sample of effect sizes. All analyses were 
conducted in R using the metafor package (Viechtbauer, 2010). 
Results and Discussion 
 Descriptive Statistics. Effect sizes. After evaluating the 364 unique citations returned by 
my literature search, we were able to calculate 233 effect sizes from 123 studies in 112 original 
reports (see Figure 2). Before performing any meta-analyses, we generated a smaller set, such 
that there was only one effect size per construct per study. For studies that contained effect sizes 
for multiple behaviors, we collapsed across variants of the same behavior, but did not across 
behaviors of different categories. For instance, for Gardner et al.’s (2013) study, we collapsed 
“drinking alcohol” with “having a second drink,” but NOT with “snacking” or “active 
commuting.” 
 For the random effects model, we collapsed multiple effect sizes by using the mean of 
each study’s relevant correlations. For the mixed effects model and meta-analytic regressions, we 
selected the effect size that was most unique in terms of its moderator values. For instance, since 
most studies measured behavior using self-report, we prioritized effect sizes drawn from 
behaviors measured using observation. Similarly, we selected effect sizes that were farthest from 
the norm in terms of the sample’s mean habit strength or the lag time between habit and behavior 
measurement. This procedure allowed us to maximize the variance available for the predictor 
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variables in our meta-analytic regressions. For both the random and mixed effects models, the 
final sample included 132 effect sizes (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Flow chart of studies through the meta-analysis. 
  
 
 Participants. The set of effect sizes represented data collected from 53,262 participants. 
Studies’ sample sizes ranged from 13 to 11,390 (M=414.30, SD=1,034.29). These samples were 
collected from participants in Australia (k=7), Belgium (k=3), Canada (k=4), China (k=1), 
Denmark (k=1), Finland (k=3), Germany (k=6), Greece (k=1), Ireland (k=1), Italy (k=1), Japan 
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(k=1), Kenya (k=1), Korea (k=2), the Netherlands (k=42), Norway (k=8), Poland (k=1), Portugal 
(k=1), Romania (k=1), Sweden (k=2), the UK (k=29), and the United States (k=21). Weighting 
by sample size, the mean sample gender was 61% female (SD=17%), and the mean sample age 
was 28.40 years (SD=15.93). 
 Behaviors. The effect sizes were mostly drawn from behaviors among the 20 that we had 
used in my external survey: physical activity (k=26), unhealthy snacking (k=17), fruit and 
vegetable consumption (k=13), alcohol consumption (k=7), active commuting (k=6), internet use 
(k=6), smoking (k=5), flossing (k=4), car use (k=3), IT assistance utilization (k=3), food safety 
practices (k=3), seafood consumption (k=3), medication adherence (k=2), prolonged sitting 
(k=2), sunscreen use (k=2), hand washing (k=2), condom use (k=1), recycling (k=1), depositing 
in savings (k=1), and texting while driving (k=1). In addition, there were 24 effect sizes from 
other behaviors, which tended to be specific to a particular population (e.g., using protective 
motorcycle gear or watching a popular Swedish soap opera). 
 Measurement of behavior. The methods of behavioral measurement included self-report 
(k=121) and experimenter observation (k=17), either in person or electronically. The units of 
behavioral measurement included frequency (k=64), volume (k=52), a frequency/volume 
composite (k=12), proportion (k=10), or single dichotomous performance (k=6). There were 17 
effect sizes calculated from the control conditions of intervention studies, and 11 effect sizes 
from samples that were already attempting to modify their behavior before recruitment. 
 Measurement of habit. On average, studies measured habit 20.97 days before measuring 
behavior (SD=89.64), using 8.63 items (SD=3.47), yielding a habit strength score of 50% of the 
maximum possible (SD=20%). 
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 Overall Effect Size Results. First, in order to paint a general picture of the literature, we 
modeled weighted mean effect sizes under random-effects assumptions. Overall, the mean habit-
behavior effect size was 0.531 (95% CI = 0.461, 0.565), which reached statistical significance. 
There was significant heterogeneity of the effect sizes, I2=96.72% (95% CI = 95.85, 97.55). 
Because much of this heterogeneity is likely due to my drawing the effect sizes from different 
behaviors, we also calculated mean effect sizes by behavior type (see Table 10 for estimates, and 
figures 3-8 for forest plots). When we included the moderator variables coded from each study 
(see next section), the heterogeneity reduced slightly to I2=96.22% (95% CI = 95.05, 97.26). 
When we included the moderator variables drawn from the external survey (see next section), the 
heterogeneity reduced to I2=95.20% (95% CI = 93.50, 96.72). 
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Table 10: Summary of overall results for each behavior type, random effects assumptions, ordered by 
magnitude of estimated effect size. 
95% CI Behavior k Estimated Effect (r) SE Lower Upper 
I2 
Sunscreen Use 2 1.3327 0.5056 0.3417 2.3237 98% ** 
Flossing 4 0.9965 0.1915 0.6211 1.3718 95% ** 
Car Use 3 0.8139 0.2725 0.2797 1.3480 96% ** 
Fruits & Vegetables 13 0.6315 0.0636 0.5070 0.7561 92% ** 
Internet Use 6 0.6029 0.1273 0.3534 0.8524 94% ** 
Medication Adherence 2 0.5984 0.1763 0.2529 0.9439 80% * 
Active Commuting 6 0.5702 0.2402 0.0995 1.0409 98% ** 
Alcohol 7 0.5278 0.0602 0.4098 0.6459 75% ** 
Miscellaneousa 24 0.5159 0.0520 0.4140 0.6178 93% ** 
Recycling 1 0.4730 0.0402 0.3941 0.5519 NAb  
Food Safety Practices 3 0.4641 0.1623 0.1461 0.7822 81% ** 
IT Assistance Use 3 0.4617 0.0876 0.2900 0.6333 76% * 
Exercise 26 0.4418 0.0435 0.3565 0.5272 93% ** 
Seafood Consumption 3 0.4202 0.1293 0.1667 0.6737 98% ** 
Smoking 5 0.4166 0.1157 0.1899 0.6432 93% ** 
Unhealthy Snacking 17 0.3867 0.0493 0.2900 0.4834 91% ** 
Savings Deposits 1 0.3490 0.0918 0.1690 0.5290 NAb  
Condom Use 1 0.2930 0.1379 0.0227 0.5633 NAb  
Texting & Driving 1 0.2690 0.0486 0.1738 0.3642 NAb  
Prolonged Sitting 2 0.2510 0.0875 0.0794 0.4226 56%  
Hand Washing 2 0.0264 0.0429 -0.0576 0.1105 76% * 
a. Behaviors not included in the external survey. 
b  Sub-samples with only 1 effect size have no I2 value. 
*p<.05, **p<.01 
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Figure 3: Forest plots for behaviors included in external survey.  
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Figure 4: Forest plots for behaviors included in external survey, continued.  
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Figure 5: Forest plots for behaviors included in external survey, continued.  
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Figure 6: Behaviors included in external survey, but with only one effect size in final sample. 
 							
Figure	7:	Behaviors	not	included	in	the	external	survey																													
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 There was some asymmetry visible in the contour-enhanced funnel plot (Figure 8), which 
tends to indicate the presence of publication bias. Nonetheless, the regression test found no 
significant funnel asymmetry, z=1.258, p=.21, and the trim-and-fill technique estimated the 
number of missing studies at 0. My inferences about publication bias are limited, as the high 
degree of heterogeneity implies the existence of multiple population effect sizes among the 
sample effect sizes. 
 
Figure 8: Funnel plot of effect sizes included in random effects model. The angled white, light 
grey, and dark grey bands indicate p > .1, p<.05, and p>.01, respectively; in all other areas, 
p<.01. 
 
 
Habit-Behavior Correlation (r) 
	69		
 Moderator Model 1: Variables Coded from Each Study (k=112).  To examine the 
effects of my moderator variables on the habit-behavior relationship, we created two models with 
assumptions of mixed effects. Because external survey moderators were not available for all of 
the behaviors in my sample, we did not test those moderators in Model 1. Instead, we included as 
predictors: sample age, sample gender, habit measure length, mean habit strength, habit-behavior 
measure lag, the mode of behavior measurement (self-report vs. observation), the units of 
behavioral measurement (frequency vs. volume, proportion, dichotomous, and composite), 
whether the sample was already trying to modify the behavior before recruitment, and whether 
the study was an intervention. Finally, as in Studies 1 and 2, we tested for the Age × Gender 
interaction. 
 This model indicated the sample heterogeneity as I2=96.22% (95% CI = 95.05, 97.26), 
which reflects a significant lack of homogeneity. A larger habit-behavior effect size was 
associated with non-intervention studies, the use of longer habit-strength measures, the use of 
self-reported measures of behavior, and a shorter time period elapsed between the measurement 
of habit and the measurement of behavior (see Table 11). We illustrated the effects for 
continuous moderator variables using Johnson and Huedo-Medina’s (2011) moving constant 
technique, examining habit measure length (Figure 9) and habit-behavior measurement temporal 
lag (Figure 10). We also found that effect sizes from the control groups of intervention studies 
were significantly larger than effect sizes from non-intervention studies. 
	70		
   
Table 11: Meta-analytic regression, mixed-effects assumptions, Model 1.  
Note: Regression coefficient (b) describes relationship between moderator variable and effect size; positive b 
indicates that greater moderator value predicts a stronger habit-behavior relationship. 
a. Dummy coded, comparison is “Behavior: Measurement is Observation” 
b. Dummy coded, comparison is “Behavior: Measurement Units are Frequency” 
c. Calculated with each moderator entered in its mean-centered form. 
	71		
Figure 9: Moving constant plot of the habit-behavior relationship by length of habit strength 
measure, with other moderators controlled at their mean values (Mixed-effects Model 1). 
 
 
 
 
	72		
Figure 10: Moving constant plot of the habit-behavior relationship by length of time in between 
measurement of habit strength and measurement of behavior (Mixed-effects Model 1). 
 
 
 
 
 Model 2: All Moderators (k=94). We also conducted a second mixed effects model in 
order to test the moderating roles of the variables gained from my external survey. Please see the 
included tables for the descriptive statistics and correlations between behaviors in terms of 
frequency (Table 12), contextual stability (Table 13), and natural reinforcement (Table 14), as 
well as the within-behavior correlations for the three constructs (Table 15). 
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Table 15: Within-behavior correlations between frequency, stability, and reward, study 3.
Frequency Frequency Stability
& Stability & Reward & Reward
1. Exercise .05 .61 ** .05
2. Fruit & Vegetables .20 .50 ** .15
3. Unhealthy Snacking .34 ** .18 .23 *
4. Alcohol .14 .21 .08
5. Internet - .10 - .11 .17
6. Smoking .36 .39 ** .62 **
7. Seafood .24 .49 ** .28
8. Food Safety .33 ** .40 ** .29 **
9. Active Commuting .29 .08 - .04
10. Handwashing - .06 .14 .37 **
11. IT Use .23 - .10 - .35
12. Car Use .27 * .11 .02
13. Sunscreen .53 ** .60 ** .47 *
14. Sitting - .08 .09 - .18
15. Flossing .47 ** .57 ** .27 *
16. Recycling .16 .40 ** .42 **
17. Savings .16 .24 * .14
18. Condom Use .41 .42 ** .42
19. Medication .60 ** .55 ** .22
20. Texting & Driving .27 .09 .23
*p<.05, **p<.01
	77		
 This model is based on the first one, but in order to limit the number of predictors and 
avoid depleting the available degrees of freedom, we kept only the variables that demonstrated a 
statistically significant effect (habit measure length, use of self-reported behavioral measure, 
habit-behavior measurement lag, intervention). To these, we added the moderator variables 
describing the behavior from which the effect size was drawn—namely, the behavior’s average 
frequency, the stability of its context, and its tendency to provide natural reinforcement. We also 
included the interaction terms resulting from all combinations of these three variables. 
 Model 2 again found significant heterogeneity, I2=95.20% (95% CI = 93.50, 96.72). Like 
Model 1, larger habit-behavior effect sizes were associated with non-intervention samples, 
longer habit strength measures, the use of self-report measures of behavior instead of 
observation, and a shorter lag between the measurement of habit and the measurement of 
behavior (see Table 16). Among the moderators drawn from the external survey, contextual 
stability demonstrated a marginally significant positive relationship with effect size (see Figure 
11). There was also a marginally significant interaction between the effects of frequency and 
natural reinforcement. Finally, there was a significant three-way interaction between the effects 
of frequency, contextual stability, and natural reinforcement. 
 We have illustrated this 3-way interaction in Figure 12 by creating subsamples using 
median splits. High and low frequency behaviors are represented on plots 1 and 2, respectively. 
High and low natural reinforcement are illustrated in each plot by separate lines. The lines 
correspond to the effect of contextual stability (x-axis) on the estimated mean habit-behavior 
effect size (y axis). As this Figure shows, the generally positive effect of contextual stability on 
the habit-behavior relationship is reduced in cases of low-frequency behaviors, and entirely 
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reversed in cases of behaviors that are low in frequency and low or negative in natural 
reinforcement. 
 
 
 
 
Table 16: Meta-analytic regression, mixed effects model 2. 
  b SE(b) z p 
Sample is Intervention Controla -0.2457 0.0808 -3.042 .002 
Habit: Measure Length 0.0147 0.0057 2.584 .010 
Behavior: Measure is Self-Reportedb 0.4225 0.0623 6.781 <.001 
Habit-Behavior Measurement Lag -0.0012 0.0006 -2.032 .042 
Typical Behavioral Frequency 0.0055 0.0050 1.096 .273 
Typical Contextual Stability 0.0065 0.0039 1.656 .098 
Typical Natural Reinforcement -0.0149 0.0243 -0.614 .539 
Interaction: Frequency × Stability -0.0011 0.0011 -1.051 .293 
Interaction: Frequency × Reinforcement 0.0063 0.0038 1.683 .092 
Interaction: Stability × Reinforcement -0.0032 0.0030 -1.071 .284 
Interaction: Frequency × Stability 
  × Reinforcement -0.0010 0.0005 -2.041 .041 
Interceptc 0.4812 0.0253 19.0198 <.001 
Note: Regression coefficient (b) describes relationship between moderator variable and effect size; positive b 
indicates that greater moderator value predicts a stronger habit-behavior relationship. p values in boldface reached 
conventional levels of significance (p<.05). 
a. Dummy coded, comparison is “Sample is from non-intervention study” 
b. Dummy coded, comparison is “Behavior: Measurement is Observation” 
c. Calculated with each moderator entered in its mean-centered form. 
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Figure 11: Moving constant plot of the habit-behavior relationship by contextual stability, with 
other moderators controlled at their mean values (Mixed-effects model 2). 
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Figure 12: Plot of the 3-way interaction between contextual stability, behavioral frequency, and 
natural reward on the estimated habit-behavior relationship, all other moderators controlled at 
their mean values (Mixed-effects model 2). 
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General Discussion 
Overview 
 Habits are an important psychological construct because they exert a powerful influence 
on behavior and because they are ubiquitous in daily life. Psychological theory tends to define 
habits as patterns of frequent behavior that are triggered automatically by cues in the 
environment. The contributions of frequency and automaticity have been very well demonstrated 
in the empirical literature. Less is known about the mental association that links environmental 
cues with the performance of behavioral, even though the assumption of such an association 
forms the basis of habit theory and of my most commonly used methods. In the present research, 
we aimed to catch a glimpse of the association and to evaluate a selection of ideas that are 
implicit in an association-based view of habits. To this end, this dissertation reported three 
studies: an experiment, a test of a new measurement tool, and a meta-analysis. 
 In Study 1, we looked for evidence of the cue-behavior association, using a word-
completion task to prime experimental participants with features of a bathroom environment and 
test whether this brought flossing to mind. We also measured their flossing habits in terms of 
frequency, automaticity, and two new constructs: contextual stability and natural reinforcement. 
In Study 2, we attempted to measure participants’ flossing habits in terms of their mental 
associations between flossing and features of the environment in which they floss. We created 
three versions of a new Implicit Association Test that allowed participants to populate the task 
stimuli with objects in their bathrooms, sounds in the bathrooms, and activities in their nightly 
routines. In Study 3, we aggregated studies on habit strength across a wide spectrum of behaviors 
to gain insight on the general structure of habits as a psychological construct. We also performed 
a new survey in order to describe each behavior in terms of its typical frequency, contextual 
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stability, and natural reward, and attempted to use these aspects to interpret the various habit-
behavior relationships represented in my sample of effect sizes. Each of these studies contributed 
to an understanding of habit in multiple ways. 
 Detecting the cue-behavior association. Studies 1 and 2 used computer-based tasks 
intended to detect and measure the mental cue-behavior association that is thought to underlie 
habits. In Study 1’s word-completion task, priming participants with bathroom-related concepts 
did not appear to bring flossing to mind, no matter the strength of their flossing habits. In Study 
2’s Implicit Association Test, the strength of participants’ flossing habits seemingly had no effect 
on the degree to which they associated flossing with the features of their flossing environment. 
Ultimately, we remain without any direct way to measure the cue-behavior association, and 
further, without any direct evidence that it is truly the mechanism by which habits operate. 
 Nonetheless, we suggest that the cue-behavior association is still worth pursuing. In 
particular, it appears that the specific nature and action of the association deserves further 
theoretical development and empirical exploration. The results of my studies call into question 
my assumption that the association is semantic in nature—that it is mediated by activation 
passing through networks of general concepts such as “bathroom” and “flossing.” Instead, future 
research might investigate the possibility of an association that connects the perception of 
environmental cues directly to behavioral schema. Studies in kinesiology and sports psychology 
have observed specific patterns of brain activation in trained athletes while visualizing the 
performance of their sport. Could we use this methodology to develop profiles of neural 
activation corresponding to habitual actions, such as flossing? Would we find that objects from 
the flossing environment elicit this profile more strongly in those who have a stronger flossing 
habit? Might this effect persist even if word association tests of the same people revealed no 
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difference? Such a procedure would not make for a feasible measure of habit strength in most 
habit studies, of course, but it might point us toward the constructs that we ought to target with 
new measures. 
 Contextual stability and natural reinforcement. In my push to explore beyond 
frequency and automaticity, we set out to test two classic hypotheses of habit theory: that 
behaviors should form into the strongest habits when they (a) occur in a consistent context, and 
(b) feel good. We hoped to demonstrate these effects in various behavioral realms, and to 
introduce tools to aid in their further exploration. Study 1 deployed two new scales: The first, a 
measure of contextual stability, specified to fully describe a behavior in terms of Ajzen and 
Fishbein’s (1977) TACT concepts; the second, a new measure of the pleasant and unpleasant 
sensations and feelings that people experience as a result of doing and not a behavior. We found 
that my measure of stability was reliable, and that it predicted flossing habit strength in tandem 
with natural reinforcement. Study 3 found that, across 20 different behaviors, a high degree of 
contextual stability predicts a strong relationship between habit strength and behavior. Also, the 
effect of contextual stability interacts with both natural reward and frequency. 
 Overall, my studies seem to have supported the idea that both contextual stability and 
natural reinforcement are at work in basic habit processes. These concepts are not new to habit 
theory, but they have been rather under-utilized in an empirical literature that is focused mainly 
on the automaticity component of habit. In future research, these constructs or some version of 
them deserve consideration and may well enter into common use alongside the SRHI, and that 
the literature will see a renewed vigor in the effort to identify and develop new and promising 
habit constructs. 
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 For instance, although Study 2 included “other people” in its measure of contextual 
stability, we have not even scratched the surface of the vast, unexplored realm of social 
perception and influence in habit theory. Because people, as social animals, are naturally attuned 
to other people, it would follow that habits and all of their supporting processes are tightly 
woven into the fabric of interactions with family, friends, coworkers, neighbors, and so on. 
Perhaps next we will delve into the psychological processes involved in the transmission of 
habits through normative perception in dyads. Or, as one of the participants in Study X phrased it 
in the comments section, “my girlfriend and I both floss, but only when we’re around each 
other.” 
 Age and gender. We examined the roles of age and gender throughout the present 
research, hypothesizing that (a) women would report stronger flossing habits than men, (b) 
flossing habits would increase in strength with age, (c) the latter effect would be more 
pronounced in men than in women. Results yielded some evidence for all of these hypotheses, 
but each was only supported in a different one out of the three studies. We found an age effect 
only in Study 2, wherein older participants reported flossing more frequently than younger 
participants. We found a gender effect only in Study 3, wherein samples that had more women 
yielded stronger habit-behavior correlations. We found an age-gender interaction only in Study 
1, wherein flossing habit strength increased with age more for male than for female participants. 
 Overall, evidence concerning age and gender in habits is mixed. It seems to suggest that 
both are indeed important considerations in habit research, but does not conclusively enumerate 
what specific roles they play. One likely implication is that age and gender play many different 
roles. Especially when considering a variety of behaviors as we did in my meta-analysis, future 
research should accommodate the possibility a wide range of gender and age differences, not 
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only in the overall habit but in its contributing factors as well. Even considering a single 
construct and behavior—the natural reinforcement in exercise habits, for example—a multitude 
of possible effects spring readily to mind. 
 The good and bad physical sensations that follow a hearty run are likely to differ between 
a child and a grandparent. The emotional consequences of skipping a workout are likely 
experienced in terms of oft-gendered values and beliefs, such as those deriving from an 
environment that scrutinizes weight and appearance, or those deriving from an environment that 
reveres competitive achievement. Hopefully, the self-relevant implications of joining a sports 
team will differ less for boys and girls born in the last 10 years than for men and women raised in 
a time when female physicality was discouraged. Each story told by future habit research will 
require research methods tuned to different sensitivities, and each promises to contribute to habit 
theory in a different way. 
Strengths 
 Although the three studies in this dissertation leave the bulk of its original questions 
unanswered, they do offer a number of features that are not commonly found in the relevant 
literatures. For one, as observed in the meta-analysis, the number of studies on flossing in habit 
research is still small, and we are happy to contribute to the body of findings in this area. Studies 
1 and 2, though they did not reveal significant effects, stand out in a habit literature that remains 
mostly correlational. Study 2’s use of the IAT, though it did prove to be an effective measure, is 
among a very small number of studies that have employed non self-report gauges of habit 
strength. Perhaps most importantly, my proposal and investigation of contextual stability and 
natural reinforcement add attention to the set of theoretical habit constructs, which has been 
largely dominated by frequency and automaticity. In addition, the broad scope of my meta-
	86		
analysis affords a unique advantage. Few previous studies have included multiple behaviors, and 
fewer still have drawn on the differences between behaviors to produce new insights into habit as 
a general construct. Further, if the use of SRHI-based measures continues to grow at its current 
pace, this may well be the last time that it is feasible to fit the entire literature into a single meta-
analysis. 
Limitations 
 Although we did make use of experimental methods, my only findings of interest are 
based on data that are correlational in nature. Consequently, there is no evidence concerning 
causality or developmental factors. Although experimental and longitudinal designs are rare in 
the current body of habit research, they are of vital importance in bringing habit theory to its full 
potential. Health psychologists’ most pressing questions often revolve around how habits form 
over time, and how one might design techniques to build up healthy ones and break down 
unhealthy ones. 
 Similarly, the current studies did not include the measurement of specific instances of 
behavior. We relied on self-reported recall of past behavior, whereas there are considerably more 
advanced methods of behavioral measurement available in the habit literature. For instance, 
many of the effect sizes in my meta-analysis were derived from indices of daily diary entries. 
Some studies even used the direct observation of participants’ behavior in the lab setting. Others 
made clever use of strategies to indirectly observe behavior, such as by using electronic 
monitoring caps on bottles of vitamins or measuring the weight of used packets of floss (Judah, 
2015). Methods such as these will be important to future research, especially in an area dedicated 
to decoding behavior that by definition is often done without conscious intent or awareness. 
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 In addition, although my studies were set up to test for gender and age effects, my 
selection of measures does not allow us to evaluate the ideas that led us to hypothesize these 
effects in the first place. We cannot interpret what it means for habit theory that older people 
have stronger flossing habits than younger people unless we can find a clearer picture of why this 
is the case. Ultimately, habit theory will not advance so much from the mere detection of gender 
and age effects as from the empirical explanation thereof, and the resulting discovery of 
constructs that influence, interact with, and even constitute habits. 
Conclusions 
 Habit research has enjoyed a gold rush of sorts with the introduction of valid and easily 
deployed tools for measuring behavioral automaticity. While these tools have produced many 
rich returns and found fertile ground in a wide variety of behaviors, we feel there are still myriad 
untapped veins waiting for the curious souls who would venture yet further afield. Perhaps the 
richest strike of all will be the element at the very core of habit, the cue-behavior association. 
Though it remains for now a mythic treasure, its secrets promise to increase not only my 
knowledge about habits, but also my very capacity for gathering new knowledge about habits. 
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Appendix A: A review of conceptualizations of habits in previous research, including definition, 
recurring themes, and specific meaning of the term “habit” 
 
Paper Definition of Habit Key Features A “Habit” is 
Triandis, 1980 “Situation-specific sequences that are or have become automatic, so that they occur without self-instruction” 
Context, 
automaticity 
A behavioral 
sequences 
Ouellette & 
Wood, 1998 
“tendencies to repeat responses given a stable 
supporting context” 
Repetition, 
context 
A behavioral 
tendency 
Verplanken & 
Aarts, 1999 
“Learned sequences of acts that have become automatic 
responses to specific cues, and are functional in 
obtaining certain goals or end-states” 
Learning, 
automaticity, 
goals 
A behavioral 
sequence 
Aarts & 
Dijksterhuis, 
2000 
“we conceive of habits as a form of goal-directed 
automatic behavior,” “...habits are represented as links 
between a goal and actions that are instrumental in 
attaining this goal. The strength of such links is 
dependent on frequent co-activation of the goal and the 
relevant actions in the past,” “...habits can be seen as 
hierarchical mental representations in which activation 
of a goal leads to activation of a number of associated 
behaviors lower in the hierarchy.” 
Association, 
goals, 
repetition, 
learning 
A behavior; a 
mental 
representation 
Wood, Quinn, 
& Kashy, 2002 
“habit performance reflects the routine repetition of past 
acts that is cued by stable features of the environment” 
Repetition, 
automaticity, 
context 
A behavioral 
tendency 
Haddock & 
Maio, ??? 
“Habits also possess the characteristics of automaticity... 
developed as a result of repeated behavioral responses 
to a particular environmental cue” 
Automaticity, 
learning, 
repetition, 
context 
A behavior 
Verplanken & 
Orbell, 2003 
“features of a habit... a history of repetition, 
automaticity lack of control and awareness, efficiency, 
and expressing identity 
Repetition, 
automaticity, 
identity 
 
Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004 
“Behavioral schemata and their links to other contents 
in the impulsive system can be understood as habits “ 
Automaticity, 
association 
A behavioral 
schema; a 
mental 
association 
Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 2005 
“with repeated performance, behavior is assumed to 
come under the control of stimulus cues, bypassing 
intentions and perceptions of behavioral control” 
Repetition, 
learning, 
context, 
automaticity 
A series of past 
behaviors 
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Wood, Tam, & 
Witt, 2005 
“Behavioral dispositions to repeat well-practiced actions 
given recurring circumstances.” 
Repetition, 
learning, 
context 
A behavioral 
tendency 
Neal, Wood, & 
Quinn, 2006 
“response dispositions that are activated automatically 
by the context cues that co-occurred with responses 
during past performance” 
Repetition, 
automaticity, 
context, 
association, 
learning 
A response 
tendency 
Verplanken, 
2006 
“When a person repeatedly faces the same behavioural 
choice in the same situation, and thus repeats his or her 
previous response, associations build up between the 
cues that define the context and this person’s response. 
Given that the context remains stable and the response is 
satisfactory, these associations then acquire a degree of 
automaticity” 
Repetition, 
association, 
context, 
automaticity 
A response 
tendency 
Verplanken & 
Wood, 2006 
“Habits are a form of automaticity in responding that 
develops as people repeat actions in stable 
circumstances” 
Automaticity, 
learning, 
repetition, 
context 
Automaticity in 
responding 
Webb & 
Sheeran, 2006 
“Behaviors that are performed frequently in stable 
contexts support the development of habits” 
Repetition, 
context, 
learning 
A behavior 
Wood & Neal, 
2007 
“Habits are learned dispositions to repeat past 
responses. They are triggered by features of the context 
that have covaried frequently with past performance, 
including performance locations, preceding actions in a 
sequence, and particular people. Contexts activate 
habitual responses directly, without the mediation of 
goal states.” 
Learning, 
context, 
repetition, 
automaticity 
A behavioral 
tendency 
Verplanken, 
2007 
“Habit is behavior that has a history of repetition, is 
characterized by a lack of awareness and conscious 
intent, is mentally efficient, and is sometimes difficult to 
control” 
Repetition, 
automaticity A behavior 
Verplanken, 
2008 
“repeated behavior that has gained a degree of 
automaticity, and is executed in stable contexts” 
Repetition, 
automaticity, 
context 
A behavior 
Gardner, 2009 “automatic responses to everyday contexts, learned through repeated performance in those contexts” 
Automaticity, 
context, 
learning, 
repetition, 
association 
A response 
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Tobias 2009 
“Habits are defined as slowly developing associations 
between situational cues and repeatedly performed 
behavior options” 
Learning, 
association, 
context, 
repetition 
A mental 
association 
Webb, Sheeran, 
& Luszczynska, 
2009 
“a history of reinforcement means that the learned 
response is elicited relatively automatically when the 
associated cue is encountered” 
Learning, 
automaticity, 
association, 
context 
 
Collins & 
Mullan, 2010 
“predispositions to act without conscious intention... 
likely when behaviors are performed with high 
frequency in stable situational contexts” 
Automaticity, 
repetition, 
context 
A behavioral 
tendency 
Lally, van 
Jaarsveld, Potts, 
& Wardle, 2010 
“As behaviours are repeated in consistent settings they 
then begin to proceed more efficiently and with less 
thought as control of the behaviour transfers to cues in 
the environment that activate an automatic response: a 
habit” 
Repetition, 
learning, 
automaticity, 
context, 
automaticity 
 
Gardner, 2011 
“behavioural patterns learned through context-
dependent repetition: repeated performance in 
unvarying settings reinforces context-behaviour 
associations such that, subsequently, encountering the 
context is sufficient to automatically cue the habitual 
response” 
Learning, 
context, 
repetition, 
association, 
automaticity 
A behavioral 
tendency 
Orbell & 
Verplanken, 
2011 
“Habit might be usefully characterized as a form of 
automaticity that involves the association of a cue and a 
response.” 
Automaticity, 
association Automaticity 
Judah, Gardner, 
& Aunger, 2012 
“The formation of habit – that is, a learnt automatic 
response to contextual cues – requires initiation of a 
behaviour and repetition in a constant context” 
Learning, 
automaticity, 
context, 
repetition, 
association 
A response 
Nilsen, Roback, 
Broström, & 
Ellström, 2012 
“Habit is behaviour that has been repeated until it has 
become more or less automatic, enacted without 
purposeful thinking, largely without any sense of 
awareness” 
Repetition, 
learning, 
automaticity 
A behavior 
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Appendix B: The Self-Report Habit-Strength Index (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003) 
 
Please rate each of the following statements from 1-5 in terms of how much you agree or 
disagree with them: 
 
1  2  3  4  5* 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly somewhat Agree nor Somewhat Strongly 
    Disagree 
 
(Behavior) is something that... 
 
___ 1. I do frequently. 
___ 2. I do automatically. 
___ 3. I do without having to consciously remember. 
___ 4. that makes me feel weird if I do not do it. 
___ 5. I do without thinking. 
___ 6. that would require effort not to do it.  
___ 7. that belongs to my (daily, weekly, monthly) routine.  
___ 8. I start doing before I realize I’m doing it.  
___ 9. I would find hard not to do.  
___ 10. I have no need to think about doing.  
___ 11. that’s typically “me.” 
___ 12. I have been doing for a long time. 
** 
 
 
 
*The items are accompanied by response scales anchored by agree/disagree and preferably 
should contain five or more response categories.  
 
**Some items may have to be reworded in line with the behavior under study. 
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